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DUKE-ING OUT PATTERN OR PRACTICE
AFTER WAL-MART: THE EEOC AS FIST
ANGELA D. MORRISON*
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has an essential
role to play in bringing pattern or practice suits, and now is the time for it to
assert its role. A pattern or practice claim, also called a systemic claim, is one
in which an employer has regularly and purposefully discriminated against a
class of employees based on their religion, race, sex, color, or national origin,
such that the discrimination is the employer’s standard operating procedure.
In recent years, the Supreme Court has limited private litigants’ access to the
courts in ways that impact the ability of plaintiff classes to assert systemic
claims of employment discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. The culmination of the Court’s limitation on private Title VII pattern
or practice suits was the 2011 case, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes. Post
Wal-Mart, the private pattern or practice class appears to be dead, and with it
the advantages of pattern or practice suits for litigants and the courts.
At the same time, lower courts have begun to limit the EEOC’s ability to
bring pattern or practice claims in its own name. Specifically, they have
restricted the scope of the EEOC’s class and limited remedies for an employer’s
pattern or practice of discrimination. What these decisions fail to recognize,
however, is the EEOC’s unique role and history in enforcing Title VII. As an
institutional player and by design, the EEOC is best suited to litigate systemic
violations of Title VII. Additionally, the EEOC’s administrative process
addresses many of the due process concerns of both employee-victims and
employers. Preserving the EEOC’s litigation authority—both in terms of the
* Visiting Assistant Professor, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada,
Las Vegas. Thanks to the faculty of the William S. Boyd School of Law for their
comments and support in writing this Article. In particular, I thank Fatma Marouf
and Anne Traum for their comments on an early version and presentation of this
Article, and Ruben Garcia and Elaine Shoben for their comments. I also thank the
attendees and participants in the UNLV Works-in-Progress session—Fatma Marouf,
Mike Kagan, Chris Walker, Andy Hessick, Jean Sternlight, Ruben Garcia, and Ann
McGinley—for their helpful suggestions. Finally, thank you to Matthew Wright for
his research expertise.
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scope of employees for whom the EEOC can seek relief and the type of damages
it can recover—is necessary to ensure the effective enforcement of Title VII.
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INTRODUCTION
The pattern or practice employment discrimination suit, rather
than being knocked out by the Supreme Court in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
v. Dukes,1 has a natural champion in the United States Equal
Employment
Opportunity
Commission
(EEOC
or
“the
Commission”). Many legal scholars have focused on the Supreme
Court’s 2011 decision in Wal-Mart and its negative impact on the
future of systemic employment discrimination claims.2 In particular,
commentators have viewed the Court’s decision in Wal-Mart as
effectively ending the private pattern or practice claim.3 In the
decade after Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1991,4 which
amended Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,5 there “ha[d] been
a substantial increase in disparate treatment class actions” due to the
availability of punitive and compensatory damages in intentional
discrimination cases.6 But in the years immediately preceding Wal1. 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
2. See, e.g., Tristin K. Green, The Future of Systemic Disparate Treatment Law, 32
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 395, 395 (2011) (showing how, since Wal-Mart, “an
individualistic model of organizational wrongdoing more broadly has led to undertheorizing, even mis-theorizing, of entity responsibility for systemic disparate
treatment”); Melissa Hart, Civil Rights and Systemic Wrongs, 32 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB.
L. 455, 455 (2011) (critiquing “the Court’s novel and careless interpretations of Title
VII and explain[ing] the threat [Wal-Mart] poses to the continued viability of pattern
and practice claims”); Michael Selmi, Theorizing Systemic Disparate Treatment Law: After
Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 32 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 477, 477 (2011) (“[A]ssess[ing] the
future of systemic discrimination litigation” and “emphasiz[ing] the need to go
beyond statistical analysis to create a narrative of discrimination”).
Some
commentators, however, disagree with this assessment. See, e.g., Deborah M. Weiss, A
Grudging Defense of Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 24 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 119, 119–20 (2012)
(asserting that the Court’s decision in Wal-Mart does not mean the end of class
certification for private pattern or practice claims so long as plaintiffs pay greater
attention to merits issues at the certification stage).
3. See Richard Thompson Ford, Beyond Good and Evil in Civil Rights Law: The
Case of Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 32 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 513, 517–18 (2011) (“The
obvious lesson [from Wal-Mart] is that the future looks dim for employees bringing
claims of discrimination against their employers”); Green, supra note 2, at 397
(noting that the Wal-Mart decision “called into question the future of systemic
disparate treatment law”); Hart, supra note 2, at 459 (commenting that the decision
possesses “considerable potential to make systemic disparate treatment claims nextto-impossible to certify”); Selmi, supra note 2, at 479 (observing that the case “raised
serious questions about the continuing viability of large class actions”). This Article
uses the term “private pattern or practice” to refer to pattern or practice claims
brought by private individuals rather than a government agency such as the EEOC or
U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ).
4. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C.).
5. Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VII, §§ 701–16, 78 Stat. 241, 253–66 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2012)).
6. Selmi, supra note 2, at 478–79; see also Tristin K. Green, Targeting Workplace
Context: Title VII as a Tool for Institutional Reform, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 659, 701 (2003)
(“The 1991 amendments authorizing compensatory and, in some circumstances,
punitive damages . . . provide an incentive for privately-instituted class-wide
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Mart, courts had already appeared more reluctant to certify class
actions in employment discrimination cases.7 As others have pointed
out, the Court’s decision in Wal-Mart is just the latest manifestation of
its discomfort with certifying employment discrimination claims that
focus on general, widespread harms.8
At the same time, the EEOC’s role in the enforcement of Title VII
has received relatively little attention in legal scholarship.9 And,
litigation”); Michael Selmi, The Price of Discrimination: The Nature of Class Action
Employment Discrimination Litigation and Its Effects, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1249, 1254 (2003)
(noting the “sharp increase in class action litigation” that resulted from the
availability of damages beyond mere equitable relief).
7. See Suzette M. Malveaux, Clearing Civil Procedural Hurdles in the Quest for Justice,
37 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 621, 638 & n.99 (2011) (noting that only ten of thirty-three
class certifications were granted in employment discrimination cases from 2008 to
2010 (citing Kenneth Jost, Class Action Lawsuits, CQ RESEARCHER, May 13, 2011, at
433, 448)).
8. See, e.g., Ford, supra note 3, at 513–14 (discussing the traditional view of civil
rights as individualistic and arguing for a more collectivist view of employment
discrimination law that seeks to address collective harms); Green, supra note 2, at
400–10 (criticizing the majority opinion in Wal-Mart for substantively changing the
systemic disparate treatment theory to impose entity liability “only for individual
moments of disparate treatment at high levels within the organization”); Hart, supra
note 2, at 457 (arguing that “[t]he Court’s rejection of statistical modeling for
remedial determinations [in Wal-Mart] rests on a novel interpretation of Title VII
that leads to a misapplication of the Rules Enabling Act”); Weiss, supra note 2, at 173
(stating that “[l]ong before Wal-Mart, courts had displayed some reluctance to certify
structural class actions”).
9. There are scholars who have given the EEOC’s role in litigation some
attention. See, e.g., Jason R. Bent, Systemic Harassment, 77 TENN. L. REV. 151, 193–201
(2009) [hereinafter Bent, Systemic Harassment] (arguing that the EEOC should focus
on injunctive relief and not monetary damages based on what the author views as the
differing purposes of section 706 and section 707 of Title VII and on efficiency
concerns); Jason R. Bent, The Telltale Sign of Discrimination: Probabilities, Information
Asymmetries, and the Systemic Disparate Treatment Theory, 44 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 797,
800–01 (2011) [hereinafter Bent, Telltale Sign of Discrimination] (observing that the
EEOC’s focus on systemic cases through its Systemic Initiative calls for further
clarification of the application of systemic disparate treatment theory in cases arising
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and the Americans with
Disabilities Act, in claims based on hostile work environment, and in claims brought
by individual private plaintiffs); Green, supra note 2, at 453 (noting that some courts
have limited the EEOC’s ability to seek relief other than injunctive or declaratory
relief in pattern or practice claims).
Others have looked at the EEOC’s role as an agency. See, e.g., Melissa Hart,
Skepticism and Expertise: The Supreme Court and the EEOC, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1937,
1937 (2006) (examining the lack of deference that the Supreme Court has afforded
the EEOC in its interpretation of federal anti-discrimination laws); Nancy M.
Modesitt, Reinventing the EEOC, 63 SMU L. REV. 1237, 1238–39 (2010) (asserting that
the EEOC has failed to live up to its mission of reducing workplace discrimination
through its administrative processing and arguing for a complete overhaul of the
EEOC’s organization and authority).
Additionally, Professor Michael Selmi
conducted an empirical study in the early 1990s and concluded that the EEOC’s
administrative processing of claims was an obstacle that resulted in “meritorious cases
being dismissed for failure to comply with those procedures” and that the private bar
was better equipped to handle employment discrimination claims. Michael Selmi,
The Value of the EEOC: Reexamining the Agency’s Role in Employment Discrimination Law,
57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 64 (1996). See generally Michael Waterstone, A New Vision of Public
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there has been no real analysis of the EEOC’s role in bringing
pattern or practice claims as opposed to private litigants’ role in the
wake of Wal-Mart, beyond noting that the EEOC is not required to
seek class certification to bring a pattern or practice claim.10
However, the EEOC itself has noted that one of the impacts of
Wal-Mart is that it “may result in some of those [1.5 million]
claimants filing sex discrimination charges against the company
with the EEOC.”11
This Article begins with the background of the Title VII pattern or
practice claim before turning to the advantages plaintiffs gain by
bringing a discrimination claim as a pattern or practice, which
include: a more favorable method of allocating burdens of proof, the
ability of pattern or practice claims to address unconscious or hidden
biases, the efficiencies gained in litigating as a class, and the wider
array of remedies. The Article next discusses the concerns courts and
scholars have expressed regarding systemic class claims. Courts have
been reluctant to certify classes alleging a pattern or practice based
on procedural concerns. This reluctance arises from a perceived lack
of due process for victims of discrimination and their employers and
from a general view that Title VII vindicates an individual right,
making it ill-suited for class litigation.
A careful examination of the EEOC, its litigation authority, and its
administrative processing reveals that the concerns animating the
Court’s limitations on private pattern or practice litigation are
minimal or nonexistent when it comes to EEOC litigation of such
claims. Yet, just as the private pattern or practice claim has come
under attack, so too has the EEOC’s litigation authority. Thus, the
Article concludes that courts limiting the EEOC’s ability to bring
pattern or practice claims misapprehend its role as a federal agency
litigating in the public interest. The EEOC is a public actor and, as
such, it resolves many of the concerns expressed about private
pattern or practice claims. First, the EEOC is exempt from the
Enforcement, 92 MINN. L. REV. 434, 458–78 (2007) (arguing that the EEOC and DOJ
should take on a greater role in enforcing the American with Disabilities Act’s (ADA)
anti-discrimination in employment and public accommodations provisions, and, in
particular, that both agencies should focus on structural litigation of ADA claims).
10. See, e.g., Hart, supra note 2, at 475 (“One possibility [absent legislative
reform] is a greater reliance on the enforcement efforts of the E.E.O.C. Given that
pattern or practice claims pursued by the E.E.O.C. are not subject to the
requirements of Rule 23, these actions may be a more effective tool for addressing
structural discrimination than private litigation subject to the post-Wal-Mart
interpretation of Rule 23.”).
11. U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, STRATEGIC PLAN FOR FISCAL YEARS
2012–2016, at 32 (2012) [hereinafter EEOC STRATEGIC PLAN FOR FY 2012–2016],
available at http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/plan/upload/strategic_plan_12to16.pdf.

MORRISON.OFF.TO.WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE)

92

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

11/2/2013 12:36 PM

[Vol. 63:87

procedural barriers facing private litigants, such as class certification,
statutes of limitations, and challenges based on mandatory arbitration
clauses. Second, the EEOC’s pre-suit administrative processing and
political accountability protect employers’ due process rights. Third,
EEOC litigation results in enhanced due process protections for
victim-employees and their employers. Fourth, as an institution, the
EEOC possesses special authorization and expertise in litigating
systemic claims. Finally, that the EEOC litigates in the public interest
as the sole “master of its case” means it is not just vindicating an
individual right, but also enforcing the public interest in ensuring
workplaces are free from illegal discrimination. In light of the WalMart decision and courts’ concerns over certifying private class claims
of systemic employment discrimination, the EEOC must throw its hat
into the ring and champion the goals underlying Title VII.
I.

BACKGROUND OF THE TITLE VII PATTERN OR PRACTICE CLAIM

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides protection to
workers in the United States from some forms of discrimination in
employment.12 Section 703 of Title VII makes it illegal for an
employer to discriminate against an employee on the basis of the
employee’s “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”13 Unlawful
discrimination encompasses a range of actions that an employer may
undertake based on an employee’s protected status, including failure
to hire, termination of employment, failure to promote, or altering
an employee’s terms and conditions of employment.14
Section 706 authorizes individuals to bring a suit alleging unlawful
discrimination under Title VII based on a charge of discrimination
filed with the EEOC.15 Individuals asserting a Title VII claim
generally bring it using one of three theories:
individual
disparate treatment,16 systemic disparate treatment,17 or disparate
12. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2012).
13. Id. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
14. Id. § 2000e-2(a).
15. Id. § 2000e-5(f)(1). An aggrieved individual may file an action based on a
charge of discrimination after (1) the EEOC dismisses the charge and issues a “right
to sue” letter to the individual; (2) after the charge is outstanding 180 days and the
individual requests and receives a “right to sue” letter; or (3) the EEOC finds cause,
conciliation fails, and the EEOC issues the individual a “right to sue” letter. Id. The
individual must file suit within ninety days of receiving the “right to sue” letter. Id.
16. There are “three fundamental elements necessary in every individual
disparate treatment case: (1) the plaintiff suffers an adverse employment action, (2)
the employment action is linked to the defendant, and (3) the defendant’s action is
motivated by a protected characteristic of the plaintiff.” Michael J. Zimmer, A Chain
of Inferences Proving Discrimination, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 1243, 1244 (2008).
17. Pattern or practice claims are also called systemic claims, but they are really
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impact.18 The dividing line between disparate treatment and
disparate impact claims is that disparate impact does not require a
showing of intent to discriminate.19
A pattern or practice claim is one type of systemic disparate
treatment claim in which the plaintiff alleges that an employer
“regularly and purposefully” engaged in discrimination against a class
of employees protected by Title VII.20 It requires the plaintiff to
demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the
discriminatory policy is the employer’s “standard operating
procedure—the regular rather than the unusual practice.”21 Senator
Humphrey explained in his remarks supporting the passage of Title
VII that “[a] pattern or practice [of discrimination] would be present
only where the denial of rights consists of something more than an
isolated, sporadic incident, but is repeated, routine, or of a
generalized nature,” meaning that “[t]here would be a pattern or
practice . . . if a company repeatedly and regularly engaged in acts
prohibited by the statute.”22 Moreover, private plaintiffs asserting a
pattern or practice of discrimination under Title VII generally seek
class-wide relief and, therefore, must seek certification under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23.23
Initially, private plaintiffs and the government brought pattern or
practice claims alleging discrimination in hiring, firing, promotion,
and pay policies.24 In the almost two and a half decades since the
one sub-type of systemic disparate treatment claims. See, e.g., Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters
v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 (1977). Another sub-type of systemic disparate
treatment claims is one in which the employer has a policy that on its face
discriminates against a protected category. See, e.g., L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v.
Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 704 (1978) (addressing an employer’s formal policy that
“required its female employees to make larger contributions to its pension fund than
its male employees”).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k). See generally Elaine W. Shoben, Disparate Impact Theory
in Employment Discrimination: What’s Griggs Still Good for? What Not?, 42 BRANDEIS L.J.
597 (2004) (providing an overview of the disparate impact model and arguing for
more robust use of disparate impact claims in employment discrimination litigation).
19. Shoben, supra note 18, at 601.
20. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335.
21. Id. at 336.
22. Id. at 336 n.16 (quoting 110 CONG. REC. 14270 (1964)).
23. See, e.g., Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 156 (1982) (stating that
an individual, private litigant who wishes to bring suit seeking class-wide relief must
obtain class certification); Davis v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 516 F.3d 955, 967–69
(11th Cir. 2008) (holding that private plaintiffs must obtain class certification under
Rule 23 to have standing to bring a pattern or practice claim under Title VII); see also
118 CONG. REC. 7168 (1972) (noting that “many Title VII claims are necessarily class
action complaints”).
24. See Bent, Systemic Harassment, supra note 9, at 156–62 (tracing the
development of systemic harassment theory and noting that early systemic theory
developed in cases such as Teamsters where the context was “hiring, firing, and
promotion decisions”).

MORRISON.OFF.TO.WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE)

94

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

11/2/2013 12:36 PM

[Vol. 63:87

Supreme Court recognized hostile work environment claims,
including sexual harassment, as cognizable claims under Title VII,
most district courts also have affirmed the ability of plaintiffs to assert
pattern or practice hostile work environment claims.25
II. ADVANTAGES OF THE PATTERN OR PRACTICE CLAIM
Pattern or practice claims present several advantages for plaintiffs
over individual disparate treatment claims. First, plaintiffs enjoy a
more favorable allocation of burdens of proof and stronger
presumptions. Second, the pattern or practice claim is better suited
to addressing unconscious or hidden biases. Third, it provides
savings in litigation costs to plaintiffs, defendants, and courts.
Fourth, courts have greater flexibility at the remedial phase once a
pattern or practice has been demonstrated. Finally, plaintiffs can
seek broader discovery and relief by asserting a pattern or practice
claim rather than an individual disparate treatment claim.
A. More Favorable Allocations of Proof and Presumptions
The basic framework most plaintiffs use to demonstrate their
individual discrimination claims under Title VII illustrates one of the
advantages a pattern or practice claim provides to plaintiffs. The
plain language of Title VII’s disparate treatment enforcement
provision, section 703(a)(1), requires an employee to demonstrate
that she suffered an adverse employment action and that the
employer took the action with discriminatory intent.26 Employees
face two difficulties in demonstrating causation. First, there is usually
no direct evidence indicating causation, as an employer will rarely say
“I am firing you because you are a woman and I don’t like women.”27
Second, most employers proffer a reason for the employment action
25. See id. at 160–62 (discussing district court cases that have recognized a pattern
or practice claim based on allegations of a hostile work environment directed
towards female employees).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012); see also Zimmer, supra note 16, at 1244
(“There now appear to be three fundamental elements necessary in every individual
disparate treatment case: (1) the plaintiff suffers an adverse employment action, (2)
the employment action is linked to the defendant, and (3) the defendant’s action is
motivated by a protected characteristic of the plaintiff.”).
27. See Ford, supra note 3, at 520 (“Direct evidence of discriminatory intent is
exceedingly rare. Most individual cases are proven by indirect or circumstantial
evidence.”); Ann C. McGinley, [¡]Viva la Evolución!: Recognizing Unconscious Motive in
Title VII, 9 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 415, 448 (2000) (“[B]ecause of employers’
increased sophistication today there are few cases where the employer directly admits
his illegal motive for the adverse employment decision.”); Charles A. Sullivan,
Plausibly Pleading Employment Discrimination, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1613, 1641 (2011)
(“What the putative plaintiff will rarely ‘know’ is the employer’s intent in taking the
challenged action.”).
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that does not violate Title VII.28 Without direct evidence of
discriminatory intent or in the face of an employer pointing to a nondiscriminatory reason, the employee must demonstrate her case by
creating a chain of inferences that allows the fact-finder to determine
that the employer was motivated by the employee’s protected status,
or that the employer’s reason is pretext for discrimination.29
In 1973, in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,30 the Supreme Court
articulated a framework to address “the proper order and nature of
proof in actions under Title VII” in cases where the employer put
into evidence a non-discriminatory reason for the employment
action.31 In McDonnell Douglas, an African American employee was
laid off from his mechanic position and, believing that the layoff was
racially discriminatory, engaged in a number of protests against the
company.32 Subsequently, the company sought to hire qualified
mechanics, and the employee applied for reinstatement.33 The
employer rejected the application and stated it was because of the
employee’s participation in the protests.34
The district court
dismissed the employee’s Title VII claim and accepted the company’s
reason for rejection.35
The Supreme Court determined that the lower court’s dismissal of
the claim, without allowing the employee to show that McDonnell
Douglas’s stated reason was pretext for a racially discriminatory
motive, failed to apply the correct rules as to burden of proof and
how the burdens should be allocated.36 To address the issue, the
Court set forth a framework of proof and allocation of burdens that
plaintiffs may use to demonstrate their Title VII disparate treatment
claims. The plaintiff “carr[ies] the initial burden . . . of establishing a

28. See Ford, supra note 3, at 517 (noting that the employer must respond to a
well-pleaded employment discrimination claim by offering “a non-discriminatory
reason for rejecting the plaintiff”).
29. McGinley, supra note 27, at 448 (observing that, to demonstrate
discriminatory intent, plaintiffs “have resorted to proving discrimination through
indirect evidence, using the proof methodologies established in McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green”); see also Zimmer, supra note 16, at 1251, 1274 (discussing the
different methods of demonstrating inferences using the McDonnell Douglas
framework).
30. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
31. Id. at 793–94.
32. Id. at 794–95. For example, the employee, Percy Green, engaged in a
number of protests with Congress on Racial Equality, a prominent civil rights
organization, against McDonnell Douglas Corporation, including blocking road
access to the company (stall-in) and perhaps participating in a lock-in. Id.
33. Id. at 796.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 797.
36. Id. at 801.
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prima facie case of racial discrimination.”37 A plaintiff may meet this
burden by demonstrating that she belonged to a protected class, that
she was qualified for the position, that despite her qualifications she
was rejected for the position, and that “the position remained open
and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of
[plaintiff]’s qualifications.”38 If the plaintiff meets her burden, “[t]he
burden then must shift to the employer to articulate some legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the employee’s rejection.”39 If the
employer meets its burden of production, the plaintiff “must . . . be
afforded a fair opportunity to show that [the employer’s] stated
reason for [the plaintiff’s] rejection was in fact pretext.”40
The McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework remains the
basic analytical framework by which individual plaintiffs demonstrate
an inference that the employer’s actions were discriminatory.41 At all
times the ultimate burden of persuasion remains with the plaintiff.42
“[T]he focus of McDonnell Douglas cases is on the third step of the
analysis, where the plaintiff is required to carry her burden of proving
that the defendant’s asserted reason for taking the adverse
employment action was a pretext for discrimination.”43 In an
individual case, in which a plaintiff must rely on inferences to
demonstrate discrimination, not only does the plaintiff bear the
burden of production and persuasion as to her prima facie case, but
she also most likely will have to produce additional evidence to
demonstrate pretext, for which she continues to bear the burden of
production and persuasion.44
In a pattern or practice claim, however, once a class of employees
have demonstrated the prima facie case of discrimination, the
burden of production and persuasion shift to the employer.45 The
37. Id. at 802.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 803.
40. Id. at 804.
41. See Sullivan, supra note 27, at 1651 (concluding that “the lower courts are
familiar with McDonnell Douglas, and [that] any plaintiff who can plead such a prima
facie case . . . would be well advised to do so since such a pleading should make the
claim plausible”); Zimmer, supra note 16, at 1281–89 (describing the application of
the McDonnell Douglas framework to various claims of discrimination in different
factual scenarios).
42. See Sullivan, supra note 27, at 1652–53 (citing Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v.
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981); McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 804).
43. Zimmer, supra note 16, at 1249.
44. Id. at 1271–72.
45. Professor Bent has noted, however, that the Supreme Court has never
explicitly stated that the burdens of production and persuasion shift to the employer
in a pattern or practice claim. Bent, Telltale Sign of Discrimination, supra note 9, at
816. Instead, “[c]ourts and commentators have generally agreed . . . that the
rebuttable presumption (or inference) of the required discriminatory intent . . .
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Supreme Court in International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States46
articulated the model under which pattern or practice suits could
proceed.47 The plaintiff initially must show that the employer (or a
group of employers) has engaged in unlawful employment
discrimination as “a regular procedure or policy.”48 This initial
burden does not mean that the plaintiff must “offer evidence that
each person for whom it will ultimately seek relief was a victim of the
employer’s discriminatory policy.”49 Instead, the plaintiff need only
prove a prima facie case that a pattern or practice exists, often
through statistical evidence.50 Once the plaintiff meets its burden of
demonstrating sufficient evidence to support the prima facie case,
the burden of proof shifts to the employer to show that the plaintiff’s
prima facie case “is either inaccurate or insignificant.”51 If the
employer cannot meet its burden of proof to rebut the prima facie
case, then the court may determine that the pattern or practice exists
without further proof submitted by the plaintiff.52
One of the arguments the employer in Teamsters made to the
Supreme Court was that it had presented evidence that rebutted the
government’s statistical proof.53
The Court characterized the
company’s evidence as a “showing of recent changes in hiring and
promotion policies, consist[ing] mainly of general statements that it
hired only the best qualified applicants.”54 However, it rejected
this evidence because “‘affirmations of good faith in making
individual selections are insufficient to dispel a prima facie case of
systematic exclusion.’”55
This standard differs from the level of evidence that an employer
must proffer to overcome the plaintiff’s prima facie case in an
individual disparate treatment case under McDonnell Douglas. Under
the McDonnell Douglas framework, all an employer must do in
response to the employee’s prima facie case is articulate a legitimate
non-discriminatory reason capable of being put into evidence that is
specific enough to support its burden of production.56 Under
amounts to a shift in the burden of persuasion, not just the burden of production.”
Id. at 816–17.
46. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
47. Id. at 360.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 339, 360.
51. Id. at 360.
52. Id. at 361.
53. Id. at 342.
54. Id. at 342 n.24.
55. Id. at 343 n.24 (quoting Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 632 (1972)).
56. Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254–55 (1981).
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Teamsters, however, most courts have found that a claim by the
employer that it hired only qualified applicants is sufficient to
meet the employer’s burden in overcoming the plaintiff’s prima
facie case.57
If the plaintiff in a Teamsters pattern or practice claim also seeks
individual relief on behalf of the victims of the illegal pattern or
practice, then “a district court must usually conduct additional
proceedings after the liability phase of the trial to determine the
scope of individual relief.”58 Because the plaintiff has already
supported a finding that the employer did engage in a pattern or
practice of unlawful discrimination, the individual victims of the
pattern or practice are entitled to a presumption that any negative
employment decision was a result of the illegal pattern or practice.59
The employer must then demonstrate that the employee “was denied
an employment opportunity for lawful reasons.”60 This provides
employees the opportunity to “claim particular relief due [to] them”
and employers an opportunity “to rebut a prima facie case in
individual instances.”61 The Teamsters method for shifting burdens of
proof and the presumptions it affords a plaintiff, therefore, makes
bringing a pattern or practice claim more advantageous than an
individual disparate treatment claim.
B. Best Suited To Address Unconscious or Hidden Biases
Another advantage of the pattern or practice framework is its
ability to address unconscious or hidden biases, such as the problem
of the “subtle sexist” or “benign bigot.” Patterns of discrimination
that might have gone unchallenged because they are not recognized

57. See, e.g., Provenzano v. LCI Holdings, Inc., 663 F.3d 806, 815 (6th Cir. 2011)
(supervisor’s deposition stating she promoted someone who was more qualified);
Chapman v. Al Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1028 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (decision
maker’s statement that plaintiff exhibited poor interview skills and instability in work
history); Driver v. Ill. Cent. Gulf R.R., No. 87 C 6214, 1989 WL 8577, at *3 (N.D. Ill.
Jan. 30, 1989) (employer’s stated desire to hire better and more qualified
employees); cf. Anaeme v. Diagnostek, Inc., 164 F.3d 1275, 1279–80 (10th Cir. 1999)
(employer’s statements that it had no record of plaintiff applying for the position).
58. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 361.
59. Id. at 362.
60. Id. at 362 (citing Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 773 n.32
(1976)).
61. Marshall v. Kirkland, 602 F.2d 1282, 1295 (8th Cir. 1979) (citing Williams v.
Anderson, 562 F.2d 1081, 1081 (8th Cir. 1977); Clark v. Mann, 562 F.2d 1104, 1117
(8th Cir. 1977)). The Eight Circuit has also reasoned that individual determinations
of backpay rather than class-wide backpay relief was the better course “‘because it will
best compensate the victims of discrimination without unfairly penalizing the
employer.’” Id. at 1296 n.10 (quoting Stewart v. Gen. Motors Corp., 542 F.2d 445,
452 (7th Cir. 1976)).
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at the individual level become apparent once viewed in the
aggregate. Most workplaces will not have an explicit policy of
discrimination.62 Instead, just as Wal-Mart did, many corporations
give broad discretion to individual supervisors or managers in making
employment decisions.63 Such discretion, as the plaintiffs in Wal-Mart
argued, opens the door for individual managers or hirers to act in a
discriminatory manner.64 It can occur even where an individual
manager or supervisor implements policies that she believes to be
non-discriminatory but has unconscious biases that influence her
decisions.65 Individual instances of intentional discrimination are
difficult to prove not only in the absence of an “honest racist,”66
which instead requires the plaintiff to build her case on a chain of
inferences,67 but they also are “often difficult to discern on an
individual basis—[discrimination] occurs subtly in day-to-day
interactions . . .—and therefore can frequently only be identified in
the aggregate” through a pattern or practice claim.68

62. See Ford, supra note 3, at 522 (arguing that “in this day and age there almost
never is” an explicit policy of discrimination).
63. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2547 (2011) (noting that local
managers exercise “broad discretion” in making pay and promotion decisions).
64. Id. at 2548; see also Ford, supra note 3, at 523 (“Indeed, most cases of
individual discrimination do not involve discrimination by upper management or a
company policy that encourages discriminatory conduct—they involve
discrimination by lower managers which is attributed to the employer as an entity.”).
65. Professor Ford uses this unconscious bias example to demonstrate how the
employer is still liable for the discrimination because the employer “did not try hard
enough to prevent discrimination.” Ford, supra note 3, at 522. For an overview of
the operation of unconscious biases in Title VII cases, see McGinley, supra note 27.
66. The “honest racist” refers to the supervisor in Slack v. Havens, who admitted
he told a female African American employee that “[c]olored folks are hired to clean
because they clean better” and that “colored folks should stay in their place.” Slack v.
Havens, No. 72-59-GT, 1973 WL 339, at *2, *5 (S.D. Cal. May 15, 1973), aff’d as
modified, 522 F.2d 1091 (9th Cir. 1975). The term was coined by the authors of Cases
and Material on Employment Discrimination. MICHAEL J. ZIMMER ET AL., CASES AND
MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 5 (7th ed. 2008).
67. See supra note 29 and accompanying text (discussing the employee’s burden
in the absence of direct evidence of discriminatory intsent).
68. Green, supra note 2, at 433. This is particularly true in hostile work
environment claims, which require a showing that the harassment is severe or
pervasive. As one example, the court in EEOC v. Scolari Warehouse Markets, Inc. noted
that although one of the individual claimants would not be able to assert an
individual claim of sexual harassment, she still would be able to be part of a pattern
or practice claim:
[A] “great leap” would be necessary to conclude that individuals that may
not maintain individual claims also may not recover as part of a pattern-orpractice of sexual harassment. The purpose of a pattern-or-practice claim is
not to identify isolated incidents of discrimination, but to identify a pattern
of discrimination that, over time, permeates the workplace, resulting in
widespread discrimination.
488 F. Supp. 2d 1117, 1147 (D. Nev. 2007) (citation omitted).
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It is not only courts that may have difficulty recognizing subtle
forms of intentional discrimination in isolation.
Looking at
individual instances of discrimination on an incident-by-incident basis
makes it less likely that workers who have been affected will come
forward because “individuals are particularly reluctant to see
themselves as victims of discrimination when incidences are viewed in
isolation.”69 Bringing a pattern or practice claim also can put other
class members on notice that adverse actions taken against them may
have been the result of illegal discrimination.70 Additionally, not
every person affected by the illegal pattern or practice would
need to be aware of it to be included in the class due to the way
that “opt out” notice in class actions works.71 Accordingly,
addressing discrimination through a pattern or practice claim
can result in more victims of systemic discrimination coming
forward in the first instance.
C. Efficiencies in Litigation
Litigation is expensive.72 Litigating a case as a class action can
provide savings to defendants, plaintiffs, and courts.73 For plaintiffs,
69. Green, supra note 2, at 433. See generally Katie R. Eyer, That’s Not
Discrimination: American Beliefs and the Limits of Anti-Discrimination Law, 96 MINN. L.
REV. 1275 (2012) (giving an overview of studies that have shown the reluctance of
individuals to attribute treatment to discrimination and arguing that much of this is
due to American beliefs). Eyer credits this reluctance to persistent beliefs in meritocracy
and unwillingness to believe discrimination is widespread. Id. at 1278–79.
70. Cf. Malveaux, supra note 7, at 631 (noting that evidence in a class action can
“put[] others on notice of potential deceptive practices of which they may not have
been aware”); Jean R. Sternlight, Mandatory Binding Arbitration Clauses Prevent
Consumers from Presenting Procedurally Difficult Claims, 42 SW. L. REV. 87, 119 (2012)
(explaining that class actions permit plaintiffs to “represent other similarly situated
persons who do not know they have been harmed, and who do not even know, at
least initially, that a class action has been filed on their behalf”).
71. Sternlight, supra note 70, at 120.
72. See RONALD L. BURDGE, UNITED STATES CONSUMER LAW ATTORNEY FEE SURVEY
REPORT 2010–2011, at 11 (2011), available at www.nclc.org/images/pdf/litigation/
fee-survey-report-2010-2011.pdf (reviewing consumer law attorneys’ fees from 2007 to
2011). In 2010, the national average for a consumer law attorney’s hourly rate was
$304 and the national median was $300. Id.
73. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 allows federal courts to certify a group of
plaintiffs as representative of a class of potential plaintiffs. FED. R CIV. P. 23(a). The
prerequisites to any class action are (1) numerosity, (2) commonality, (3) typicality,
and (4) adequacy of representation. Id. Numerosity means that a “class is so
numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1). A
class meets the commonality requirement if the class presents “questions of law or
fact common to the class.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2); see E. Tex. Motor Freight Sys.,
Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 403 (1977). Typicality requires that the class
representative be a member of the class at the time the district court certifies the
class. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(3); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 403 (1975). Finally, the
class representatives must “fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.”
FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(4). Once a class meets these preliminary requirements, courts
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bringing an action together as a class can reduce the information
costs of bringing suit.74 Instead of hundreds or thousands of
individual lawsuits all seeking similar information from the defendant
in discovery, a class only needs to depose each witness once, pay once
for counsel to review deposition transcripts and issue discovery
requests, and can pay the associated costs jointly.75 It also may be the
only way for many employees with smaller claims and limited
resources to challenge systemic discrimination.76
Bringing an employment claim collectively rather than individually
also results in better outcomes for the plaintiffs.77 Such cases “are less
likely to be dismissed and less likely to lose on motion for summary
judgment” than individual lawsuits.78 Plaintiffs in a collective action
also win at trial more often than individual plaintiffs.79
Litigation likewise has emotional costs in terms of “peace of
mind.”80 Moreover, “[i]n employment cases, individuals who choose
to bring lawsuits against their employer may face retaliation.”81 When
look to whether the class is maintainable under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23(b). The Rule sets forth four general types of classes: (1) the incompatible
standards class; (2) the limited funds class; (3) the injunctive or declaratory relief
class; and (4) the superiority or predominance class. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b).
74. See Bent, Telltale Sign of Discrimination, supra note 9, at 827 (“The parties’
relative information costs are the ‘costs of gathering and presenting evidence on the
contested issue.’” (quoting Bruce L. Hay & Kathryn E. Spier, Burdens of Proof in Civil
Litigation: An Economic Perspective, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 413, 419 (1997))); see also
Malveaux, supra note 7, at 631 (“[T]he class action enables individuals to pool their
resources, which allows them to share litigation risks and burdens, and more easily
retain counsel for small value claims.”).
75. In a study commissioned by the Federal Judicial Center about attorney views
of the costs of federal civil litigation, each deposition drove up the cost of litigation
by 5%, and attorneys reported “that in their practice the volume of discovery is a
primary factor driving the cost of litigation.” THOMAS E. WILLGING & EMERY G. LEE III,
IN THEIR WORDS: ATTORNEY VIEWS ABOUT COSTS AND PROCEDURES IN FEDERAL CIVIL
LITIGATION 14 (2010), http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/costciv3.pdf/$file
/costciv3.pdf.
76. See Malveaux, supra note 7, at 621 (noting the importance of this procedural
tool for people with little resources) see also Sternlight, supra note 70, at 88
(highlighting how arbitration clauses enhance this problem).
77. See Laura Beth Nielsen et al., Individual Justice or Collective Legal Mobilization?
Employment Discrimination Litigation in the Post Civil Rights United States, 7 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 175, 189 (2010) (analyzing employment discrimination lawsuits filed in
federal court from 1988 through 2003).
78. Id. The researchers in the study defined “collective legal mobilization” as
“cases involving multiple plaintiffs, certified class actions, and representation by a
public-interest law firm or the EEOC.” Id.
79. Id.
80. Jean R. Sternlight, Tsunami: AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion Impedes
Access to Justice, 90 OR. L. REV. 703, 723 (2012).
81. Id.; see also Malveaux, supra note 7, at 631 (arguing that “class action[s]
create[] a more level playing field between an employer and employee” by
protecting individual employees from retaliation). The 31,208 charges of retaliation
received by the EEOC in the last fiscal year (FY) demonstrate that this fear is not
unfounded. See Charge Statistics FY 1997 Through FY 2012, U.S. EQUAL EMP.
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representative plaintiffs in a pattern or practice claim take on
these emotional costs, the absent class members benefit. The
class action thereby can provide relief to individuals who may
have otherwise been unwilling to take on the emotional cost or
too afraid to step forward.82
Defendants, too, can experience cost savings by litigating against a
class rather than against several individual plaintiffs.83 Not only can
defendant employers take advantage of the efficiency savings
provided by litigating all claims in one action, they can settle the
claims (“on the cheap of course”) often in concert with “friendly class
counsel, and thereby enter into a cozy settlement that eradicates the
potential claims of individual claimants.”84
Furthermore, several features of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23(b)(2) class benefit both plaintiffs and defendants.85 The court
may certify a class under Rule 23(b)(2) if the party opposing the class
has acted in a way that makes “final injunctive or corresponding
declaratory relief . . . appropriate.”86 The court is not required to give
the best notice possible to class members but must only make
provisions for “appropriate” notice, which can be done at the court’s
discretion.87 This is in contrast to the notice requirements for class
O PPORTUNITY C OMMISSION , http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement
/charges.cfm (last visited Oct. 12, 2013) (documenting 31,208 claims of retaliation
under Title VII, which make up 31.4% of all charges the EEOC received in FY 2012).
Moreover, a growing segment of our workforce has become increasingly vulnerable
to retaliation from employers due to the workers’ or their family members’
immigration status and the federal government’s increased focus on immigration
enforcement. See Leticia M. Saucedo, Immigration Law Enforcement Versus Employment
Law Enforcement: The Case for Integrated Protections in the Workplace, 38 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 303, 310 (2010) (explaining that fears of retaliation or detection by U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement will make workers reluctant to exercise their
employment rights); see also Kati L. Griffith, Discovering “Immployment” Law: The
Constitutionality of Subfederal Immigration Regulation at Work, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y REV.
389, 419–23 (2011) (discussing the impact of state and local immigration regulation
on the enforcement of Title VII); Leticia M. Saucedo, A New “U”: Organizing
Victims and Protecting Immigrant Workers, 42 U. RICH. L. REV. 891, 931 (2008)
(discussing how employers use workers’ immigration status to control noncitizen
employees and prevent them from complaining about workplace conditions).
82. See Sternlight, supra note 80, at 723 (arguing that many class members will
avoid the costs of representation and emotional distress and that few consumers
would bring individual claims).
83. See id. at 719 n.82 (asserting that some companies occasionally prefer being
sued in class actions instead of litigating many individual claims).
84. Id. (citing Maria Glover & Charles Silver, Zombie Class Actions, SCOTUSBLOG
(Sept. 8, 2011, 10:16 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/09/zombie-class-actions).
85. See infra Part III.A.2 for an overview of the Rule 23(b)(2) class in the context
of private pattern or practice class actions.
86. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2).
87. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(A); see also Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 335 n.3
(1979) (stating that no notice is required in a Rule 23(b)(2) action, but that Rule
23(d)(2) allows the court to use its discretionary powers to require notice).
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certification under Rule 23(b)(3) and (c)(2), which require “the
best notice . . . practicable under the circumstances, including
individual notice to all members who can be identified through
reasonable effort.”88
Additionally, the class is mandatory.89 This means there is no right
for class members to opt out of the class, and the judgment or decree
binds the entire class.90 The Rule states “[w]hether or not favorable
to the class, the judgment in a class action . . . under Rule 23(b)(1) or
(b)(2), [must] include and describe those whom the court finds to be
class members.”91 Again, this differs from the effects of a class
certification under 23(b)(3) which is a voluntary class because class
members may opt out and the judgment is only binding on those
members who do not opt out.92
For representative plaintiffs and their attorneys, the lack of a
mandatory notice requirement to absent class members presents
significant time and cost savings.93 It also lessens the burden (and
associated costs) of class certification because absent class members
have no right to opt out.94 The preclusive effect also increases the
88. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3); FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2).
89. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(3).
90. Id.; see FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment (“The
judgment [embraces the class] whether it is favorable or unfavorable to the class.”);
see also In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 709, 728 (4th Cir. 1989) (indicating that when
a class is certified under Rule 23(b)(2), “all party members become mandatory class
members without any opt-out rights”), abrogated on other grounds by Amchem Prods.,
Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997); Holmes v. Cont’l Can Co., 706 F.2d 1144, 1153
(11th Cir. 1983) (asserting that absent class members have no right to opt out);
LaChappelle v. Owens-Ill., Inc., 513 F.2d 286, 288 & n.7 (5th Cir. 1975) (per curiam)
(finding that each person who is considered a class member and does not or cannot
opt out is bound by the judgment); Airline Stewards & Stewardesses Ass’n Local 550
v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 490 F.2d 636, 642 (7th Cir. 1973) (“Unless a class action is
maintained under Rule 23(b)(3), no right to opt out exists. All members of the class
are bound by the judgment.”).
91. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(3); see also Cooper v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond,
467 U.S. 867, 874 (1984) (“There is of course no dispute that under elementary
principles of prior adjudication a judgment in a properly entertained class action is
binding on class members in any subsequent litigation.”).
92. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(3).
93. The Rule states only that “the court may direct appropriate notice to the
class.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(A). The Advisory Committee notes to the 2003
amendment state that “[t]he authority to direct notice to class members in a . . .
(b)(2) class action should be exercised with care.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory
committee’s note to 2003 amendment. The Advisory Committee further indicated
that “[t]here is no right to request exclusion from a . . . (b)(2) class.” Id.
94. See Thomas R. Grande, Innovative Class Action Techniques—The Use of Rule
23(b)(2) in Consumer Class Actions, 14 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 251, 253–54 (2002)
(indicating that class members have no right to obtain personal notice and no right
to opt out, which can advantage plaintiffs because notification costs can make claims
not worth pursuing); see also Stephen J. Safranek, Do Class Action Plaintiffs Lose Their
Constitutional Rights?, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 263, 271 (“[T]he lawyers representing the
class prefer certification without a right to opt out or notice because the expense of
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appeal of class certification under Rule 23(b)(2) to representative
plaintiffs and their attorneys because defendants likely will be more
willing to settle and thus save the time and money that the plaintiffs
and their attorneys would have expended on a trial.95
The preclusive effect of the Rule 23(b)(2) class is also desirable to
defendants. Defendants have the reassurance that no matter the
outcome of the adjudication, the judgment or decree will eliminate
future suits based on the same claim.96 It is also appealing to
defendants because defense of the legality of employment actions
requires only one lawsuit.97 Finally, a pattern or practice claim
provides efficiencies to the courts because instead of resolving the
employer’s liability for systemic discrimination case-by-case, through
each affected individual bringing her own suit, a court can resolve
the employer’s liability in one suit.98
D. Efficiencies and Flexibility at the Remedial Phase
Since Teamsters, courts have been able to adapt its two-phase
approach to suit the specific factual and procedural circumstances of
various cases.99 Depending on the case, courts have used individual
hearings to determine damages, or they have used statistical
modeling to determine the appropriate backpay damages once the
plaintiffs have demonstrated the pattern or practice.100 Statistical
modeling can lead to greater efficiency and accuracy in assessing
remedies, as opposed to taking an individualized approach to

notification to class members is absent, class members cannot complain, and their
presence fattens the recovery.”).
95. See Safranek, supra note 94, at 271 (noting that defendants are more willing
to settle a class action under Rule 23(b)(2) “because all of the possible parties will be
bound by the judgment”). See discussion infra notes 164–169 regarding concerns
about the fairness of class action settlements to plaintiffs and defendants.
96. Safranek, supra note 94, at 271; see Grande, supra note 94, at 254 (concluding
that defendants are assured that res judicata will bar all future plaintiffs from
bringing the same claims).
97. See Safranek, supra note 94, at 271 (explaining that the appearance of
institutional efficiency is ensured because only one case is required to settle
the claims).
98. Malveaux, supra note 7, at 631–32. See infra text accompanying notes 186–
189 for a discussion on the impact of the Wal-Mart decision on the ability of lower
courts to resolve individual monetary damages, such as backpay, on a class-wide basis.
99. Hart, supra note 2, at 465.
100. Id. at 470. However, as Professor Hart discusses in her article, the Wal-Mart
decision disapproved of statistical modeling as a method of determining backpay. See
infra text accompanying notes 171–172 (summarizing Professor Hart’s argument that
the Court’s approach in Wal-Mart is inconsistent with the flexible approach
encouraged in Teamsters).
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remedies for the types of systemic wrongs the pattern or practice
claim addresses.101
Indeed, as Professor Melissa Hart has explained, in many
circumstances a statistical modeling approach may be the only way to
accurately capture the type of discrimination that occurs in modern
workplaces “like Walmart, which are characterized by ‘a large low
wage workforce, high turnover, a decentralized management
structure’ and highly subjective criteria for employee evaluation.”102
Assessing damages through statistical modeling rather than through
individual accounts of harm means that an employer is liable not only
for damages to those plaintiffs who come forward and testify, but
also for damages to everyone affected by the discriminatory pattern
or practice.103 This more accurately captures the systemic nature of
the harm because it focuses on the “[employer’s] liability for
creating the discriminatory structural and cultural context of the
particular workplace.”104
Statistical modeling to assess damages ensures that individuals
harmed by systemic discrimination receive some sort of recovery and
an employer that engages in systemic discrimination will be deterred
from future discrimination.105 Moreover, other employers will be
discouraged from engaging in systemic discrimination lest they face a
pattern or practice claim, resulting in fewer cases of systemic
discrimination.106
E. Broader Discovery and Relief
Because a pattern or practice claim involves systemic, companywide discrimination, plaintiffs are granted broader discovery and are
able to obtain broader relief. For plaintiffs who allege pattern or
practice claims, the scope of discovery is much broader, even prior to
achieving class certification, and can include company-wide
discovery.107 On the other hand, in an individual disparate treatment
101. Hart, supra note 2, at 469–70 (explaining that statistical models are sometimes
more accurate in assessing the appropriate remedy than individual hearings).
102. Id. at 468–69 (footnote omitted) (quoting Ford, supra note 3, at 516).
103. Id. at 469–70.
104. Id. at 469.
105. See Malveaux, supra note 7, at 631–32 (“[P]otential class-wide liability
encourages companies to voluntarily comply with the law and deters future
misconduct.”).
106. Id. at 631.
107. See, e.g., Duke v. Univ. of Tex. at El Paso, 729 F.2d 994, 995–96 (5th Cir. 1984)
(reversing the trial court’s decision to limit discovery of university-wide promotion
and pay records because the limitations “prejudiced [the plaintiff’s] effort to obtain
class certification”); Chen-Oster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 285 F.R.D. 294, 306–07
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (dismissing efforts to limit discovery production to a particular
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case, courts often limit the plaintiff’s discovery to her immediate
department or supervisor because only discovery regarding
individuals similarly situated to the plaintiff is relevant.108 More
extensive discovery is advantageous because a pattern manifested
through company-wide evidence, such as statements, documents,
and statistics, can show the systemic nature of discrimination in
ways that individual claims looking at isolated instances of
discrimination cannot. 109
Plaintiffs who prove a pattern or practice claim are able to seek
more expansive injunctive and declaratory relief than individual
plaintiffs.110 Individuals can recover “backpay for up to two years
preceding the filing of the charge”111 and compensatory and punitive
damages.112 The prevailing party also may recover “a reasonable
attorney’s fee” and costs.113 The statute additionally provides for the
court to issue injunctive or other equitable relief addressing the
illegal employment practice alleged in the complaint:
[T]he court may enjoin the [employer] from engaging in such
unlawful employment practice, and order such affirmative action as
may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to,

division of the company because it would impair plaintiffs’ establishment of the class
certification prerequisites); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 26 (enumerating the general
provisions governing discovery).
108. See, e.g., Brunker v. Schwan’s Home Serv., Inc., 583 F.3d 1004, 1009–10 (7th
Cir. 2009) (concluding, despite the plaintiff’s assertion that disciplinary records of
employees with different supervisors could reveal a pattern of discrimination, that
“the magistrate judge properly found irrelevant the discovery requests regarding
discrimination from supervisors who were not involved with [the plaintiff’s]
termination”); Rubinstein v. Adm’rs of the Tulane Educ. Fund, 218 F.3d 392, 398
(5th Cir. 2000) (limiting plaintiff’s discovery to his immediate department);
Tumbling v. Merced Irrigation Dist., 262 F.R.D. 509, 517 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (denying
discovery of co-worker’s personnel file because co-worker was not linked to any
discrimination against the defendant); Palmer v. N.Y. State Office of Court Admin.,
Nos. 5:00-CV-0110 (FJS/GHL), 6:07-CV-0702 (FJS/GHL), 2009 WL 1118271, at *1–2
(N.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 2009) (denying plaintiff’s discovery request for the employment
files of other employees with her job position as a “fishing expedition” because she
had not demonstrated how they were similarly situated to her).
109. See Malveaux, supra note 7 at 631 (asserting that employers can typically mask
discrimination more easily when addressing individual claims than they can when
defending claims on a class-wide basis).
110. See id. (indicating that a class action claim allows plaintiffs to share risks and
resources and that the broader scope of discovery can potentially reveal companywide trends and other evidence of deceptive practices, allowing for notice to others,
a more tailored remedy, and a more even playing field between plaintiffs and
defendant in litigation).
111. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(3)(B) (2012).
112. Id. § 1981a(a)(1). Section 1981a(b)(3) limits the recovery amount of
compensatory and punitive damages to between $50,000 to $300,000 for each
individual depending on the number of employees the employer has. Id.
§ 1981a(b)(3).
113. Id. § 2000e-5(k).
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reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay . . .
or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate.114

Thus, individual plaintiffs can recover money damages, such as
backpay, future pay, compensatory damages, and punitive damages,
in addition to appropriate equitable relief such as reinstatement.
A class of plaintiffs who win a pattern or practice claim can not only
recover damages and seek equitable relief for individuals affected by
the pattern or practice, but can also obtain wide-ranging relief that
addresses a company-wide practice.115 In contrast, courts have been
“unwilling to implement organizational solutions for individual
discriminatory decisions.”116 As a result, pattern or practice claims
remain the best option for seeking broader remedial measures that
address systemic discrimination. All of these advantages, taken
together, demonstrate the reasons why plaintiffs bring pattern or
practice claims and how pattern or practice claims operate to address
systemic discrimination. Despite these benefits, the pattern or
practice claim has come under attack by courts and scholars for a
variety of reasons. And, the Wal-Mart decision may be the final
knock-out punch that eliminates private litigants’ ability to Duke-out
these claims in court.
III. TITLE VII PATTERN OR PRACTICE SUITS DOWN FOR THE COUNT
Individuals bring their systemic, intentional discrimination
claims—both individual and class-wide—under section 706(f)(1) of
Title VII.117 To bring a pattern or practice claim, private litigants
must first obtain class certification, a litigation vehicle that was
significantly limited both procedurally and substantively in Title VII
claims by the Supreme Court’s Wal-Mart decision.118 The three
114. Id. § 2000e-5(g)(1).
115. See generally Green, supra note 6, at 678 (“The use of the class action
device . . . encourages development of solutions aimed at systemic reform.”).
116. Id. at 678 & n.79 (citing Lowery v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 158 F.3d 742, 766–
67 (4th Cir. 1998), vacated on other grounds, 527 U.S. 1031 (1999); George Rutherglen,
Title VII Class Actions, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 688, 688 (1980)).
117. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (enabling aggrieved persons to bring a civil action
against respondents named in an EEOC proceeding within ninety days after the
EEOC claim is dismissed).
118. 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2550–61 (2011). Other recent cases also may limit court
access in significant ways for plaintiff classes in employment discrimination suits. See,
e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1746, 1753 (2011) (holding
that the Federal Arbitration Act preempts individual state courts’ holdings that
arbitral class action waivers are unconscionable when the party with superior
bargaining power enforces the clause to exempt itself from responsibility for willful
injuries to the other party); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (finding that
notice pleading means that a complaint must include enough factual sufficiency “to
‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face’” (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
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named plaintiffs—Betty Dukes, Christine Kwapnoski, and Edith
Arana—sought class certification for a group of 1.5 million women,
alleging that Wal-Mart discriminated against them in pay or
promotion on the basis of their sex.119 The women claimed that WalMart made employment decisions based on gender stereotypes.120
They argued that Wal-Mart was liable for these decisions because of
its corporate culture, which permitted gendered stereotyping to
infect the company and allowed “a nearly all male managerial
workforce” to make completely subjective, discretionary decisions in
pay and promotion.121
The Court considered whether the lower court had properly
certified the Wal-Mart class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23(a) and (b)(2).122 The Court found that the class could not meet
Rule 23(a)’s commonality requirement because in Title VII cases,
commonality requires “significant proof” that an employer operates
under a general policy of discrimination, and the plaintiff class
had failed to put forward sufficient evidence indicating such a
policy.123 The Court likewise found that the plaintiffs’ statistical
evidence demonstrating a bottom line disparity failed to show
commonality, as it was based on a policy that permitted
discretionary decision making.124
The Court also determined that the class was inappropriately
certified under Rule 23(b)(2) because the class sought backpay as
part of the relief.125 It concluded that because backpay is not an
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007))). Professor Sternlight has looked at the
challenges to class actions posed by AT&T Mobility. See Sternlight, supra note 80, at
708 (asserting that broad subsequent rulings make the future of employment
discrimination class actions “look grim”). Among the obvious challenges for victims
of employment discrimination is that employees who have signed an arbitral class
action waiver will not be able to access the courts in the first instance, let alone seek
class certification. See id. at 708–09. For a discussion of the potential impact of Iqbal
and Twombly on intentional employment discrimination claims, see Sullivan, supra
note 27, at 1639–49.
119. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2547–48.
120. Id. at 2563 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 2547 (majority opinion).
123. Id. at 2553–54.
124. Id. at 2554–57.
125. Id. at 2557. This part of the decision, while unanimous, is surprising.
Although a circuit split existed about whether other types of damages, such as
punitive damages, could be incidental to a Rule 23(b)(2) class action, it had been
fairly uncontroversial that backpay was an equitable remedy that could be included
in the Rule 23(b)(2)’s injunctive or declaratory relief. See Robinson v. Metro N.
Commuter R.R., 267 F.3d 147, 165–66 (2d Cir. 2001) (accepting backpay as
injunctive or declaratory relief and permitting monetary damages in a Rule 23(b)(2)
suit, but adopting a hybrid model that would allow for notice and opt-out to class
members and provide for individualized hearings at the remedial stage); Allison v.
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“indivisible” and “single” remedy, permitting it as part of a Rule
23(b)(2) class would negatively impact both class members’ and
defendant’s rights.126 First, the Court stated that because Rule
23(b)(2) classes do not provide notice and opt-out opportunities to
absent class members, the unnamed class members’ monetary claims
are at risk if backpay is allowed.127 Second, the Court found that
backpay could not resolve the class claim “as a whole” because an
employer in a Title VII suit is entitled to an individualized
determination of each employee’s eligibility for backpay, to raise
affirmative defenses as to each employee’s claim, and to prove that its
action was lawful as to each employee.128 Each of these limitations is
based on underlying, sometimes unvoiced, concerns on the part of
the Court. The paramount reason, however, may be a perception
that Title VII addresses and protects individual rights rather than
group harms.
These limitations on a representative plaintiff’s ability to obtain
class certification directly impact the private pattern or practice
claim. First, for the reasons discussed above, bringing an individual
lawsuit is not a viable option for many victims of employment
discrimination, and so a class action remains the only option.
Second, in most federal courts, an individual plaintiff cannot bring a
pattern or practice claim using the Teamsters framework and instead
can only bring the claim as part of a class certified under Rule 23.129

Citgo Petrol. Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 425 (5th Cir. 1998) (accepting backpay as part of
equitable relief and setting four requirements providing when a 23(b)(2) class may
claim non-equitable relief); see also Malveaux, supra note 7, at 634–35 (noting that all
of the courts of appeals that have relied on the Advisory Committee on Rules of Civil
Procedure’s notes have concluded that non-predominant monetary relief is available
and that, while backpay has been historically permitted, compensatory and punitive
damages are typically only allowed if they do not predominate over injunctive and
declaratory relief).
126. See Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2557–59 (explaining that a claim for monetary
relief, such as backpay, may not be certified under Rule 23(b)(2) because of its
“individualized” nature, unlike the “indivisible nature” of injunctive or
declaratory relief).
127. Id. at 2559. The Court indicated that where absent class members were
deemed not to be entitled to backpay, they may be collaterally estopped from
seeking individual compensatory damages because Rule 23(b)(2) does not ensure
their right to decide whether to join the class or bring individual claims. See id.
128. Id. at 2557, 2560–61.
129. See Bent, Telltale Sign of Discrimination, supra note 9, at 812–13 & nn.63–64
(citing cases); Green, supra note 2, at 453 & n.231 (same). According to Professor
Bent, the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have
found that because the Teamsters framework addresses a group harm, individual
plaintiffs may not bring a pattern or practice claim using the Teamsters framework.
Bent, Telltale Sign of Discrimination, supra note 9, at 812–13 & n.63. The D.C. Circuit is
the only circuit that arguably permits individual plaintiffs to bring a pattern or
practice claim without a certified class. Id. at 813 & n.64.
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The ability to achieve class certification is essential, then, for private
plaintiffs wishing to bring a pattern or practice claim.
A. Court Concerns About Certifying Pattern or Practice Claims
1.

Rule 23(a)—Commonality
In Wal-Mart, the Court was concerned that general class-wide
claims, especially those alleging discrimination on the basis of
discretionary policies, could not meet Rule 23’s commonality
requirement because they are not capable of being solved through a
“classwide resolution.”130 To get at whether the class could meet the
commonality requirement, the Court stated it is necessary to look at
the merits of the pattern or practice claim.131 According to the Court,
in a pattern or practice claim, “the crux of the inquiry [regarding
commonality] is ‘the reason for a particular employment
decision.’”132 For the Court, this means that a plaintiff in a pattern or
practice must either point to an explicit policy, such as a testing
mechanism or company-wide evaluation procedure, or affirmatively
demonstrate a pattern or practice through “‘significant proof’ that
[the company] ‘operated under a general policy of discrimination’”
to meet the commonality requirement of Rule 23(a).133
While the Wal-Mart Court acknowledged that it had previously
recognized that discretionary policies could lead to liability under
Title VII in disparate impact claims, in Part II of its decision, the
Court expressed doubt that a discretionary policy could lead to a
claim of company-wide intentional discrimination:
But the recognition that this type of Title VII claim “can” exist does
not lead to the conclusion that every employee in a company using
a system of discretion has such a claim in common. To the
contrary, left to their own devices most managers in any
corporation—and surely most managers in a corporation that
forbids sex discrimination—would select sex-neutral, performance-

130. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2551. Professor Michael Zimmer argues that Wal-Mart
is an example of the Roberts Court’s view that antidiscrimination laws prohibit the
classification of individuals (the anticlassification theory) rather than protect classes
from subordination (the antisubordination theory). See Michael J. Zimmer, Wal-Mart
v. Dukes: Taking the Protection Out of Protected Classes, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 409
(2012).
131. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2552.
132. Id. (quoting Cooper v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond, 467 U.S. 867, 876
(1984)).
133. Id. at 2553; see also Green, supra note 2, at 408–10 (noting that under the
Court’s explanation of the systemic discrimination standard, plaintiffs must
demonstrate that high-level company officers implemented a subjective decision
making process for the purpose of discriminating against women).
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based criteria for hiring and promotion that produce no actionable
disparity at all. . . . In such a company, demonstrating the invalidity
of one manager’s use of discretion will do nothing to demonstrate
the invalidity of another’s.134

Professor Green makes the case that much of this view is driven by a
framework that “impos[es] entity liability only for individual
moments of disparate treatment at high levels within the
organization.”135 This theory stands in contrast to an understanding
that “[e]ntity liability is established in systemic disparate treatment
cases . . . based on a finding that individual instances of disparate
treatment are so widespread within the organization . . . that the
entity is in some part to blame.”136
Skepticism that intentional discrimination occurs to such a degree
that it is spread throughout the company, rather than the result of a
few bad apples, also seems to be motivating the Court’s holding.137
Part of the reason may be that the Court views earlier cases
recognizing widespread discrimination, like Teamsters or Hazelwood, as
“products of their era.”138 The era was one in which employers had
recent histories of openly discriminating against women and African
Americans, and so pattern or practice claims based on statistical
disparities where there was no explicit policy “worked reasonably well
in the 1970s and through much of the 1980s.”139 The Wal-Mart
Court’s statement that “most managers in any corporation” would not
implement discriminatory policies140 shows that the Court may doubt
that widespread discrimination exists in the modern corporation.
134. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2554.
135. Green, supra note 2, at 410.
136. Id. at 428.
137. See Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2554. However, as Professor Green has noted, “[a]
practice of regular, systemic disparate treatment . . . is unlikely to be the result of
select rogue individuals acting on biases uninfluenced by the work
cultures/practices/norms of the organization.” Green, supra note 2, at 439. In
answering the question of whether most people believe that discrimination is
common, Professor Eyer has pointed out that studies have shown that the group
that most federal judges (and five of the nine Justices) belong to—white men—is
the most likely to believe that discrimination is rare. Eyer, supra note 69, at 1316
& n.147.
138. This view that Teamsters and Hazelwood are “products of their era” is why Judge
Ikuta, in her dissent from the Ninth Circuit’s en banc Wal-Mart decision, and
Professor Richard Nagareda argued pattern or practice claims require a policy or
practice as proof of discrimination. Selmi, supra note 2, at 503 (citing Richard A.
Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 97, 152–53
(2009)); see also Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 629 (9th Cir. 2010) (en
banc) (Ikuta, J., dissenting) (asserting that without evidence of a company-wide
policy of discrimination or other evidence of company-wide discriminatory practices,
the 1.5 million claims at issue could be considered as a class), rev’d 131 S. Ct. 2541.
139. Selmi, supra note 2, at 487.
140. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2554.
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The Court in Wal-Mart and some scholars are also critical of
pattern or practice claims because of their use of aggregate proof to
support employer liability.141 In addressing commonality, the Court
stated that “[m]erely showing that Wal-Mart’s policy of discretion has
produced an overall sex-based disparity does not suffice” to
demonstrate a discriminatory “specific employment practice.”142 This
appears to be based on an individualistic view of employment
discrimination claims—a view that means a class action based on a
pattern or practice claim is only hundreds or even thousands of
individual instances of intentional discrimination lumped together.143
Thus, relying on statistics that show a bottom-line disparity to prove
intent is problematic because “the emphasis has to be on the
employer’s own blameworthiness, something that goes beyond the
reliance on statistics.”144 The Court’s underlying concerns with
commonality, then, include a view that company-wide liability in Title
VII cases requires an explicit policy or consistent practices, skepticism
that discrimination is widespread, and distrust of aggregate proof.
2.

Rule 23(b)(2) concerns
The Court’s Rule 23(b)(2) concerns include the mandatory nature
of the class and its directive that both the harm to the class and the
141. See id. at 2554–56 (discussing the statistical evidence adduced by plaintiffs and
determining that the bottom-line statistics showing a gender disparity at Wal-Mart do
not meet the requirement of “significant proof” to show commonality); Green, supra
note 2, at 451 (“Several scholars have argued that class treatment of employment
discrimination lawsuits like Wal-Mart ‘distorts’ the substantive law by allowing entity
liability to turn on aggregate proof.” (citing Richard A. Epstein, Class Actions:
Aggregation, Amplification, and Distortion, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 475 (2003); Nagareda,
supra note 138)). Professor Selmi has argued that plaintiffs must do more than rely
on a statistical showing of disparity to demonstrate a pattern or practice of
intentional discrimination because that model does not fit the context of modern
claims:
[T]he older Supreme Court pattern or practice cases were almost entirely
statistical in nature, and there is enough in the case law to suggest that a
pattern or practice claim can be based solely on statistics. But outside of
those cases from the 1970s—a time when Jim Crow’s heart was still beating—
it has never been clear why statistics can prove an intent to discriminate, and
certainly one message arising from the Wal-Mart case is that a majority of the
Supreme Court is now skeptical of the power of statistics to prove intentional
discrimination. Indeed, I would suggest that one implicit message from WalMart case is that the older cases no longer fit contemporary claims of
discrimination and we need to develop better, less statistically-dependent,
models to establish classwide claims of intentional discrimination.
Selmi, supra note 2, at 480.
142. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2555–56.
143. See Green, supra note 2, at 451–54.
144. Selmi, supra note 2, at 481. Professor Selmi notes, however, that a showing
of statistical imbalance is sufficient to establish a claim of systemic discrimination
under a strict reading of the Teamsters and Hazelwood cases, at least for unskilled
jobs. Id. at 502.
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relief sought be class-wide.145 This focuses the court’s inquiry on the
defendant’s conduct and makes an inquiry into the individualized
facts regarding each plaintiff’s harm irrelevant.146 Therefore, because
the Court views backpay as an individual remedy, its resolution on a
class-wide basis with a “Trial by Formula” method would violate the
due process rights of the class members and the defendant.147
a.

Employee class members’ due process

As discussed above, one of the benefits of a Rule 23(b)(2) class is
that it can resolve the legality of the defendant’s actions in one suit
and can effectively result in issue preclusion as to that action.148
However, as the Wal-Mart Court noted, issue preclusion is achieved
through the mandatory nature of the class, and as a result, the lack of
opt-out rights and notice could lead to a violation of the class
members’ due process rights if the relief sought does not remedy the
rights of the class as a whole.149 Because of this, class certification
under Rule 23(b)(2) is unavailable “when each individual class
member would be entitled to a different injunction or declaratory
judgment against the defendant” or “when each class member would
be entitled to an individualized award of monetary damages.”150 To
the Wal-Mart Court, the risk of violating individual class members’
due process rights was one of the problems with certifying a class
seeking backpay under Rule 23(b)(2).151 The individualized nature
of backpay means that class members should “decide for themselves
whether to tie their fates to the class representatives’ or to go it
alone—a choice Rule 23(b)(2) does not ensure that they have.”152
145. See Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2557–61 (noting that class members are not
afforded even notification of the action and that employers are entitled to
individualized determinations of monetary damages such as backpay).
146. Grande, supra note 94, at 255. Grande also notes that this is in direct
opposition to the typical inquiry in a 23(b)(3) class, which focuses on the effect of
the wrongful conduct on each individual plaintiff. Id.
147. See Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2557–58, 2561.
148. See supra notes 96–98 and accompanying text.
149. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2557–59.
150. Id. at 2557; see also Richard A. Nagareda, The Preexistence Principle and the
Structure of the Class Action, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 149, 232 (2003) (noting that by
necessity, a court adjudicates the legality of a defendant’s action as to the class as a
whole, since a court could not “ascertain the legality of [a] defendant’s conduct as to
one affected claimant without necessarily doing so as to all others”).
151. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2557.
152. Id. at 2559. The Supreme Court has also previously found that classes could
not be certified under Rule 23(a) because the representative class members were not
typical, based, in part, on the preclusive effect of the judgment or the relief sought.
See Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 158–59 (1982); E. Tex. Motor
Freight Sys., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 403–06 (1977). In Rodriguez, the Court
found that the named plaintiffs “would not ‘fairly and adequately protect the
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The Wal-Mart class argued that Rule 23(b)(2) allows backpay when
it does not “‘predominate’ over the[] requests for injunctive and
declaratory relief.”153 In rejecting this argument, the Court stated
that a “predominance test” would “create[] perverse incentives for
class representatives to place at risk potentially valid claims for
monetary relief.”154 As an example, the Court noted that class
representatives could forego seeking compensatory damages in order
to take advantage of the mandatory nature of Rule 23(b)(2) and
instead seek only backpay.155 This could result, according to the
Court, in class members with valuable compensatory claims being
bound by a suit for which they had no notice and no right to opt
out.156 And, seeking only backpay would mean that the case would be
tried before a judge rather than a jury.157 For Title VII claims,
particularly those involving hostile work environment claims in which
emotional distress damages and punitive damages compose the bulk

interests of the class,’” partly because the plaintiff’s requested remedies included a
request for a merger of two collective bargaining units, which conflicted with a “vote
by members of the class rejecting a merger.” 431 U.S. at 404–05 (quoting FED. R. CIV.
P. 23(a)(4)). In Falcon, the Court found that because the named plaintiff had failed
to show how “the adjudication of his claim of discrimination in promotion would
require the decision of any common question,” his claims could not be presumed to
be typical of the class claims. 457 U.S. at 158–59. This mattered, according to the
Court, because of “the potential unfairness to the class members bound by the
judgment if the framing of the class is overbroad.” Id. at 161 (citing Johnson v.
Ga. Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122, 1126 (5th Cir. 1969) (Godbold, J.,
specially concurring)).
153. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2559. This view stems from the argument that class
members’ interests may diverge if they seek individual damages, which would
undercut the mandatory nature of the Rule 23(b)(2) class action. See Malveaux,
supra note 7, at 635–36 (citing Allison v. Citgo Petrol. Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 412–13
(5th Cir. 1998)). This view is further supported by “the Advisory Committee’s
statement that Rule 23(b)(2) ‘does not extend to cases in which the appropriate final
relief relates exclusively or predominantly to money damages.’” Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at
2559 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment).
154. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2559.
155. Id.; see also Nagareda, supra note 150, at 164–66 (explaining that despite the
attendant risks, “the monopoly conferred upon class counsel by procedural rule” can
unlock substantial gains for the class).
156. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2559; see also Nagareda, supra note 150, at 167
(observing that class members with high-value claims are most at risk under the Rule
23(b)(2) class action). Prior to Wal-Mart, even the courts that had found Rule
23(b)(2) allowed non-predominant monetary damages for Title VII pattern or
practice claims included an opt-out provision as part of the certification. See, e.g.,
Robinson v. Metro N. Commuter R.R., 267 F.3d 147, 166 (2d Cir. 2001) (opining
that “any due process risk posed by [Rule](b)(2) class certification of a claim for
non-incidental damages can be eliminated by the district court simply affording
notice and opt out rights to absent class members for those portions of the
proceedings where the presumption of class cohesion falters”).
157. See Nagareda, supra note 150, at 166–67.
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of the recovery, the risk may be more apparent given that juries tend
to award higher damages to those with more severe injuries.158
Another concern in Wal-Mart may have been the sheer size of the
class, which may have exacerbated perceptions that class counsel and
the representative plaintiffs were driven by the potential backpay
recovery,159 not the injunctive and declaratory relief that would
remedy the structural inequalities the class also alleged. Professor
Michael Selmi has demonstrated that even when private plaintiffs
have been able to achieve class certification for a pattern or practice
claim, monetary damages are the dominant form of relief and
employers are rarely required to modify their employment practices
pursuant to injunctive or declaratory relief.160 When monetary
damages are the primary form of relief achieved in settlement, there
is generally no continued monitoring of the employer, unlike with
injunctive relief that is set out in a consent decree that requires
monitoring of the employer’s compliance.161 The focus on money
damages is problematic because it results in a “lack of oversight and
enforcement of the class action settlements involving employment
discrimination,” and is “a dramatic change from the past, when class
action employment discrimination litigation was thought to represent
one of the hallmarks of public law litigation, brought by lawyers who
were primarily interested in pursuing justice rather than profit.”162
Class actions and, in particular, their settlements, raise concerns
about class counsel and her motivations. Class counsel may be
perceived as “the driving force behind the lawsuit, [as having] more
at stake financially than any individual class member, and [as] rarely
communicat[ing] with absent class members.”163 In the settlement
context the potential for “collusion between the defendant and class

158. Id. at 166.
159. See, e.g., Suzanna Sherry, Hogs Get Slaughtered at the Supreme Court, 2011 SUP.
CT. REV. 1, 1 (arguing that in Wal-Mart, “the losing side got greedy and suffered the
inevitable consequences”).
160. See Selmi, supra note 6, at 1297 (“Monetary damages, often at minimal levels
when calculated on an individual basis, constitute the primary—and frequently the
only—relief intended to compensate for past discrimination. The lawsuits rarely
require corporations to modify their existing practices, and whatever changes occur
tend to be driven by a company’s own interests or by public relations concerns rather
than the requirements of a consent decree.”).
161. Id. at 1324–25.
162. Id. at 1325–26. Of course, neither courts nor critics of plaintiffs’ lawyers seem
troubled by the motives of lawyers representing defendant employers in these cases
and do not seem to expect employer-side lawyers to be motivated by anything other
than profit.
163. Rhonda Wasserman, Secret Class Action Settlements, 31 REV. LITIG. 889, 934
(2012).
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counsel” in orchestrating “a deal that would maximize class counsel’s
fee while minimizing recovery for the class are of real concern.”164
Increasing the potential for abuse is that some class actions are filed
as settlement-only classes. In settlement-only cases, class counsel files
for class certification and approval of the settlement of the class at the
same time.165 Of course, once a class is certified, settlement of a class
action requires the court’s approval under Rule 23(e).166 But, some
classes settle before certification, thereby escaping the procedural
protections of Rule 23(e).167 And, the desirability of the claimpreclusive effect of the settlement to a defendant may cause class
counsel to bargain away individual non-representative plaintiffs’ high
value claims to settle the suit without costly litigation.168 As Professor
Malveaux has noted, the view that class action settlements in
particular are often a bad deal for plaintiffs and a bonanza for
plaintiffs’ attorneys led to the enactment of the Class Action Fairness
Act of 2005.169
b.

Employers’ due process

The Court also found that the lower court improperly certified the
class under Rule 23(b)(2) because determining backpay through
statistical modeling would “abridge” Wal-Mart’s substantive right
under Title VII “to litigate its statutory defenses to individual

164. Id. at 933–34; see, e.g., Staton v. Boeing Co., 327 F.3d 938, 944–45 (9th Cir.
2003) (rejecting a class settlement based on inequitable distribution of a $7.3 million
award amongst class members where attorneys’ fees would have been $4.04 million);
see also Sternlight, supra note 70, at 121 (confirming that in some cases, class actions
potentially serve the interests of plaintiffs’ counsel to a greater degree than the
interests of the class of plaintiffs).
165. An example of a settlement-only employment discrimination class action is
Ingram v. Coca-Cola Co., 200 F.R.D. 685 (N.D. Ga. 2001). The plaintiff initially filed
the case as an individual racial-discrimination case and then conducted discovery on
the class issues. Id. at 687. Eventually, the plaintiff and the defendant participated in
mediation, after which the plaintiff filed for class certification and approval of a
binding settlement in principal, both of which the court approved. Id.
The Supreme Court has found that although courts need not consider whether a
potential settlement-only class under Rule 23(b) and (c) would pose “intractable
management problems,” courts must still determine whether the class can “satisfy the
requirements of common issue predominance and adequacy of representation.”
AmChem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 620, 628 (1997).
166. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e).
167. Wasserman, supra note 163, at 901.
168. Nagareda, supra note 150, at 168.
169. Pub. L. No. 102-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.); see
Malveaux, supra note 7, at 632 (explaining that the Class Action Fairness Act—which
was enacted “to provide more rigorous checks and balances” as a result of
widespread perceptions that class members gain little from class settlements while
plaintiffs’ lawyers earn substantial fees—also had the effect of liberalizing
jurisdiction for class actions).
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claims.”170 As Professor Hart has argued, this can be regarded as a
misapprehension of Teamsters and not in keeping with the flexible
approach Teamsters encouraged in remediating a pattern or
practice claim.171 The Court’s concern that the use of statistical
modeling interferes with employers’ ability to raise statutory
defenses further exemplifies the Court’s general distrust of
aggregate proof of discrimination.172
There are three additional, unstated reasons that could have
motivated the Court to ensure defendant employers receive greater
procedural protections. First, the Court may believe that holding
employers liable for backpay on the basis of a discretionary policy will
impede businesses’ ability to have discretionary policies.
In
addressing commonality, the Court hinted at this reason by stating
that “[t]he whole point of permitting discretionary decisionmaking is
to avoid evaluating employees under a common standard.”173 And, it
deems discretionary decision making within a corporation as a
“presumptively reasonable way of doing business.”174 Second, the
Court has also been concerned in the past about what it views as the
“in terrorem” effect of class actions on defendants—that “[f]aced
with even a small chance of a devastating loss, defendants will be
pressured into settling questionable claims.”175

170. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2561 (2011) (affirming that
procedural rules cannot abridge statutory rights under the Rules Enabling Act, 42
U.S.C. § 2072(b)).
171. See Hart, supra note 2 at 459–61, 464–66.
172. See supra notes 135–138 and accompanying text.
173. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2553. Requiring that plaintiffs demonstrate an
intentionally discriminatory policy on the part of a company serves business interests
and can be viewed as part of the movement to cut back on regulations governing
businesses. Green, supra note 2, at 417–18.
174. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2554. The Court asserted that a discretionary policy is
the opposite of the type of uniform policy that would be required to show
commonality under Rule 23(a):
The only corporate policy that the plaintiffs’ evidence convincingly
establishes is Wal-Mart’s “policy” of allowing discretion by local supervisors over
employment matters. On its face, of course, that is just the opposite of a
uniform employment practice that would provide the commonality needed
for a class action; it is a policy against having uniform employment practices.
It is also a very common and presumptively reasonable way of doing
business—one that we have said “should itself raise no inference of
discriminatory conduct.”
Id. (quoting Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 990 (1988)).
175. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1752 (2011); see also
Malveaux, supra note 7, at 632 (addressing defendants’ arguments “that certification
is akin to blackmail and makes the pressure to settle irresistible”); Sternlight, supra
note 70, at 719–20 (explaining that many prospective defendants relish of a prospect
of a “class-action-free world,” while some companies seek to bind customers to
arbitration agreements).
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Finally, the Court could have lingering concerns from General
Telephone Co. of the Southwest v. Falcon176 about notice to defendants.
There, the Court suggested that part of the reason Rule 23(a)
requires the representative plaintiffs’ claims to be typical of the class
claims is the notice it provides to employers regarding the types of
claims it will need to defend.177 This relates directly to the Wal-Mart
Court’s emphasis on what it views as the common source of the harm
and indivisible nature of the remedy permitted in a Rule 23(b)(2)
certified class.178 If a Rule 23(b)(2) class seeks to remedy a harm that
an employer imposed on the class as a whole, then it follows that the
employer would have actual knowledge of the pattern or practice and
know how to defend itself in the suit. However, if the class simply
seeks to remedy several individual harms, then the employer would
not necessarily be aware of the source of the harm for each individual
wrong, making the claims difficult to defend.179
B. Individual Right, Group Wrong
Finally, at the heart of much of the Court’s concern over certifying
classes for pattern or practice claims, appears to be an inherent
tension between the Court’s view of Title VII and the underlying
purpose of a systemic claim. While the Court views the statute as
designed to address discrimination against individuals, the pattern or
practice requires courts not only to decide the merits of the case by
analyzing class-based evidence, but also to fashion a remedy that
looks at the class rather than individuals.
The Court highlighted this tension in City of Los Angeles, Department
of Water & Power v. Manhart,180 in which a group of female employees
brought a class action against the Los Angeles Department of Water

176. 457 U.S. 147 (1982).
177. See id. at 160–61 (reasoning that “without reasonable specificity [of the
pleadings,] the court cannot define the class, cannot determine whether the
representation is adequate, and the employer does not know how to defend”
(quoting Johnson v. Ga. Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122, 1126 (5th Cir. 1969)
(Godbold, J., specially concurring))).
178. See Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2557 (“The key to the (b)(2) class is ‘the indivisible
nature of the injunctive or declaratory remedy warranted—the notion that the
conduct is such that it can be enjoined or declared unlawful only as to all of the class
members or as to none of them.’” (quoting Nagareda, supra note 138, at 132)).
179. Additionally, notice of the type of claims for which the class seeks
certification not only serves the defense of the current claim, but also ensures “that
future employers have adequate notice of which policies will pass muster under
Title VII and which will not. If all class actions settle, only relatively specific
analysis of the merits at the certification stage can provide this information.”
Weiss, supra note 2 at 135.
180. 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
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& Power.181 They alleged that the department’s requirement that
female employees make larger contributions to its pension plan than
male employees discriminated against women on the basis of sex in
violation of Title VII.182 The department based its policy on actuarial
tables, which showed that women as a group experience greater
longevity than men.183 Although the issue of class certification was
not before the Court, the Court considered whether
“‘discrimination’ is to be determined by comparison of class
characteristics or individual characteristics.”184 The Court’s answer
to that question foreshadowed the concerns expressed in later
cases looking at class certification.
In reaching its decision that the department’s policy, which was
based on class characteristics rather than individual characteristics,
was discriminatory, the Court focused on how the policy unfairly
impacted individuals:
The statute’s focus on the individual is unambiguous. . . . Even a
true generalization about the class is an insufficient reason for
disqualifying an individual to whom the generalization does not
apply. . . . [T]he basic policy of [Title VII] requires that we focus
on fairness to individuals rather than fairness to classes. Practices
that classify employees in terms of religion, race, or sex tend to
preserve traditional assumptions about groups rather than
thoughtful scrutiny of individuals.185

Language in the Wal-Mart decision also demonstrates the Court
views Title VII as vindicating individual rights, not class-wide
wrongs.186 The Court reiterated that “[t]he class action is ‘an
exception to the usual rule that litigation is conducted by and on
behalf of the individual named parties only.’”187 Similarly, in
discounting the notion that class-based statistical modeling is an
appropriate method of determining each employee’s entitlement to
backpay, the Court focused on Wal-Mart’s right to “individualized
determinations”188 Finally, it was concerned with “individual class
members’” claims when it found that the mandatory nature of Rule

181. Id. at 704.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 705.
184. Id. at 708.
185. Id. at 708–09.
186. A variation of the word “individual” appears in the majority opinion, partial
concurrence, and partial dissent fifty-eight times, nearly as many times as variations
on the word “discrimination” appear (sixty-seven). Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,
131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
187. Id. at 2250 (quoting Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 700–01 (1979)).
188. See id. at 2560 (“Wal-Mart is entitled to individualized determinations . . . .”).
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23(b)(2) did not allow the certification of a class that sought backpay
as part of the remedy.189 The Wal-Mart Court’s decision may be the
final bell in this round of the Duke-out over the private, pattern or
practice claim. Nonetheless, the EEOC has the ability and authority
to ensure the pattern or practice claim is not down for the count.
IV. THE EEOC’S LITIGATION AUTHORITY AND
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESSING
The EEOC’s ability to fight against the erosion of the pattern or
practice claim in the wake of Wal-Mart is best understood in the
context of the EEOC’s litigation powers and its administrative
processing of charges of discrimination. First, sections 706 and 707
of Title VII provide the EEOC with authority to bring lawsuits against
employers who violate Title VII. The legislative history of these two
sections provides an important gloss to the source and scope of the
EEOC’s ability to litigate pattern or practice claims. Second, through
its pre-suit administrative processing, the EEOC must provide the
employer notice of the claim, investigate the claim, make a
determination regarding the claim’s merits, and attempt to settle any
claim prior to filing a suit in federal court.
A. The EEOC’s Litigation Authority
The EEOC may bring suit in federal district court in its own name
against an employer who violates Title VII.190 Section 706 of the
statute specifically provides that the EEOC may bring a civil action in
federal district court against a private employer—i.e., not a federal,
state, or local government entity—engaged in unlawful employment
practices based on a charge of discrimination filed with the EEOC.191
Section 707 authorizes the EEOC to file suit whenever the EEOC has
“reasonable cause to believe” that an employer is engaged in a
“pattern or practice” of discriminating against its employees in
violation of Title VII.192
When the EEOC files a charge of
189. See id. at 2559.
190. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (2012) (allowing members of the EEOC to file
charges by or on behalf of persons claiming to be the victims of unlawful
employment practices); id. § 2000e-6(a) (granting the Attorney General the same
powers).
191. Id. § 2000e-5(f)(1).
192. Id. § 2000e-6(a). Section 707 provides:
Whenever the [EEOC] has reasonable cause to believe that any person or
group of persons is engaged in a pattern or practice of resistance to the full
enjoyment of any of the rights secured by [Title VII], and that the pattern or
practice is of such a nature and is intended to deny the full exercise of the
rights herein described, the [EEOC] may bring a civil action in the
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discrimination under section 707, section 706 “and regulations
promulgated thereunder govern the form and content of such a
charge and the manner in which the employer should be notified of
the allegations of wrongdoing.”193
Initially, Congress created the EEOC to receive and investigate
charges of employment discrimination.194 However, the EEOC had
no independent authority to file suit against employers who engaged
in unlawful discrimination.195 Instead, the United States Attorney
General, through the U.S. Department of Justice, had authority to
bring suit in federal court against employers under section 707 and to
seek injunctive and other equitable relief.196
In 1972, Congress amended Title VII, transferring the authority to
bring lawsuits against private employers from the United States
Attorney General to the EEOC.197 Sections 706 and 707 of the Act, as
amended, now authorize the EEOC to bring an action in federal
district court asserting that an employer has engaged in a pattern or
practice of discrimination.198 It may also bring suit based on an
aggrieved individual or individuals’ charge of discrimination filed
with the EEOC.199 In amending Title VII, the question was not
whether Congress should grant the EEOC additional authority to
enforce Title VII, but rather “what kind of additional enforcement
powers should be granted to the EEOC.”200
As initially proposed, the 1972 amendments would have created an
administrative judicial proceeding within the EEOC to adjudicate
claims of discrimination “and issue judicially enforceable cease-anddesist orders.”201 Instead, a compromise was reached that allowed the
appropriate district court of the United States by filing with it a complaint
(1) signed by [the EEOC], (2) setting forth facts pertaining to such pattern
or practice, and (3) requesting such relief, including an application for a
permanent or temporary injunction, restraining order or other order against
the person or persons responsible for such pattern or practice, as [the
EEOC] deems necessary to insure the full enjoyment of the rights herein
described.
Id.
193. EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 56 (1984).
194. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 706, 78 Stat. 241, 259
(1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5).
195. See Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 358–59 (1977)
(explaining that initially, the EEOC’s function was limited to informal methods of
conciliation and persuasion).
196. § 707, 78 Stat. at 261 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6).
197. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, §§ 4–5, 86
Stat. 103, 104–07 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5 to -6).
198. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(f), 2000e-6(a), (c).
199. Id. § 2000e-5(f).
200. Occidental Life Ins. Co., 432 U.S. at 361.
201. 118 CONG. REC. 4939–40 (1972).
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EEOC to bring suit in federal court.202 The Conference Committee’s
section-by-section analysis of the amendments made clear that the
purpose of the amendments was to vindicate the public interest
through broad relief and more robust enforcement of Title VII.203
For example, the Conference Committee’s analysis of section
706(f)(1), which provides for enforcement of Title VII, states:
[I]t is not intended that any of the provisions contained therein
shall affect the present use of class action lawsuits under Title VII in
conjunction with Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The courts have been particularly cognizant of the fact that claims
under Title VII involve the vindication of a major public interest,
and that any action under the Act involves considerations beyond
those raised by the individual claimant. As a consequence, the
leading cases in this area to date have recognized that many Title
VII claims are necessarily class action complaints and that,
accordingly, it is not necessary that each individual entitled to relief
be named in the original charge or in the claim for relief. A
provision limiting class actions was contained in the House bill and
specifically rejected by the Conference Committee.204

The 1972 amendments specifically recognized the need for pattern
or practice claims that addressed issues beyond that of the “individual
claimant.”
Similarly, the amendments sought to provide broad relief to victims
of discrimination:
The provisions of [section 706(g)] are intended to give the courts
wide discretion exercising their equitable powers to fashion the
most complete relief possible. . . . [T]he scope of relief . . . is
intended to make the victims of unlawful discrimination whole,
and that the attainment of this objective rests not only upon the
elimination of the particular unlawful employment practice
complained of, but also requires that persons aggrieved by the
consequences and effects of the unlawful employment practice be,
so far as possible, restored to a position where they would have
been were it not for the unlawful discrimination.205

Thus, Congress also intended that the amendments would provide
make-whole relief.
The Conference Committee’s section-by-section analysis says very
little about the EEOC’s pattern or practice authority other than to
outline the timeline for the transfer of this authority from the
202.
203.
204.
205.

Id. at 4940.
See id. at 7168.
Id.
Id.
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Attorney General to the EEOC.206 The analysis clarifies that “the
Commission’s present powers to investigate charges of discrimination
remain. In addition, the EEOC now has jurisdiction to initiate court
action to correct any pattern or practice violations.”207 Only one
federal circuit court has addressed directly whether section 707
provides the sole method for the EEOC to bring a pattern or practice
claim.208 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit concluded
that the EEOC may bring a pattern or practice claim and use the
Teamsters burden-shifting framework to prove the claim under either
section 706 or section 707.209 The court determined that the
distinction between section 706 and section 707 is “the presence of a
previously filed charge by an aggrieved person.”210
Through the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress provided a means
for litigants to recover not only equitable remedies such as backpay
and injunctive relief but also compensatory and punitive damages.211
Congress listed the need for additional remedies “to deter unlawful
harassment and intentional discrimination in the workplace” as one
of the purposes of the Act.212 The legislative changes also were
necessary “to respond to recent decisions of the Supreme Court by
expanding the scope of relevant civil rights statutes in order to
provide adequate protection to victims of discrimination.”213
Importantly, because litigants could now seek non-equitable
remedies, the Act also provided for a jury trial.214
206. See id. (providing that the authority would be transferred two years after the
amendment’s enactment).
207. Id.
208. See Serrano v. Cintas Corp., 699 F.3d 884, 894 (6th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, No.
12-1347, 2013 WL 1951616 (Oct. 7, 2013). The Eighth Circuit has not squarely
addressed the EEOC’s authority under section 706 or section 707 but, in a recent
case, appears to have presumed that when the EEOC asserts a section 706 claim in its
complaint, it must prove discrimination as to each individual claimant. See EEOC v.
CRST Van Expedited, Inc., 679 F.3d 657, 674 (8th Cir. 2012).
209. See Serrano, 699 F.3d at 896.
210. Id.
211. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1) (2012). Compensatory damages include “future
pecuniary losses, emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of
enjoyment of life, and other nonpecuniary losses.” Id. § 1981a(b)(3). Despite these
important policy objectives, Congress did include limitations on the amount of
compensatory and punitive damages that each claimant may recover, which ranges
from $50,000 to $300,000, depending on the size of the employer. Id.
212. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 2, 105 Stat 1071, 1071.
213. Id. § 3, 105 Stat at 1071.
214. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c). In 1972, when Congress amended Title VII, Senator
Ervin of North Carolina proposed an amendment that would have provided for jury
trials even though the only remedies available at the time under Title VII were
equitable remedies. 118 CONG. REC. 4919 (1972). The amendment failed with fiftysix nays and thirty yeas. Id. at 4920. Senator Ervin’s stated purpose in proposing the
amendment was to preserve “the right to demand a trial by jury on the issues of fact”
and “citizen participation in the enforcement of the provisions of this bill.” Id.
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Congress intentionally included the EEOC within the class of
complaining parties who could seek punitive and compensatory
damages under the statute.215 This subsection was part of a technical
amendment requested by EEOC chairman Evan J. Kemp to clarify the
EEOC’s ability to seek punitive and compensatory damages.216 Mr.
Kemp argued that the change was needed because, without it, the
EEOC’s enforcement abilities would be undermined:
It would undermine the Commission’s ability to enforce Title
VII . . . if private parties, but not the EEOC, are allowed to seek the
enhanced remedies. Indeed, if that were the case the Commission
might have a duty to refer all cases of intentional discrimination to
private attorneys because, by filing suit, the Commission would
dramatically reduce the relief available to the victims. This would
be true especially in the case of sexual harassment claims; because
there is often no back pay at stake in those cases, the only monetary
relief would be compensatory and punitive damages.217

Congress intentionally permitted the EEOC to seek the full-range of
remedies under the Civil Rights Act of 1991 thereby serving the
broader purpose of ensuring victims of illegal discrimination receive
adequate relief.
B. The EEOC’s Pre-suit Administrative Processing
The EEOC must meet certain conditions precedent to file suit
through its administrative processing of a charge of discrimination.
Specifically, the EEOC must receive an underlying charge, provide
notice of the charge to the employer, conduct an investigation, make
a reasonable cause determination, and attempt to conciliate.218 A
charge provides the EEOC with the initial jurisdiction to investigate
an employer’s alleged violation of Title VII.219 The charge may be
initiated “by or on behalf of a person claiming to be aggrieved, or by
a member of the Commission.”220 The EEOC must serve the
employer with notice of the charge within ten days of receipt.221 To
the extent that the initial notice provided to the employer of the
charge of discrimination is deficient, notice of the reasonable cause
determination through the letter of determination can cure the

215. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(d)(1).
216. See 137 CONG. REC. 28861 (1991).
217. Id.
218. Id. § 2000e-5(b), (f).
219. See id. § 2000e-5(b); see infra note 227 (discussing cases that have found that
the charge is the “jurisdictional springboard” of the investigation).
220. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b).
221. Id.; 29 C.F.R. § 1601.14(a) (2012).
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deficiency.222 And, if the EEOC alleges any class claims in
subsequent litigation, the allegations must be sufficiently related
to those for which the employer received notice in the
administrative processing.223
Generally, an employer may not challenge the adequacy of the
EEOC’s investigation in any subsequent litigation, and, even when
such a challenge is made, courts will generally reject it as long as the
EEOC performed at least “some” investigation into the charge.224
Title VII grants the EEOC broad investigatory powers, and the EEOC
can issue an administrative subpoena during the investigation and
seek enforcement of its subpoena in federal court.225 The EEOC’s
investigation may consist of interviews of the charging parties and
witnesses, on-site inspections, and requests for information and
production of other evidence.226 Once the EEOC’s investigation is
under way, it is not limited to the allegations in the charge but may
include any additional violations of federal employment
discrimination law it uncovers.227 The EEOC is also authorized to
222. Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 372 n.32 (1977).
223. See, e.g., EEOC v. Pioneer Hotel, Inc., No. 2:11 CV 1588, 2013 WL 129390, at
*3 (D. Nev. Jan. 9, 2013) (finding that the EEOC notified the employer during the
investigation that the class was alleging discrimination based on “national origin,
Mexican, and . . . color, brown,” and that the EEOC’s class allegations based on
“Latino and dark-skinned employees” in litigation were accordingly “reasonably
related to the underlying EEOC charge” and determination).
224. See, e.g., EEOC v. Keco Indus., Inc., 748 F.2d 1097, 1100 (6th Cir. 1984)
(finding that the district court erred in undertaking a review of the sufficiency of the
EEOC’s investigation); EEOC v. Gen. Elec. Co., 532 F.2d 359, 370 n.31 (4th Cir.
1976) (holding that EEOC investigations are not reviewable because the EEOC has
no adjudicatory power and its proceedings are not binding). Even when courts do
allow employers to challenge an EEOC investigation, the courts afford the EEOC
great deference. See, e.g., EEOC v. NCL Am., Inc., 536 F. Supp. 2d 1216, 1221–23 (D.
Haw. 2008) (explaining “that challenges to the adequacy of [EEOC investigations]
are subject to a deferential standard of review”); EEOC v. James Julian, Inc., 736 F.
Supp. 59, 60 (D. Del. 1990) (reiterating that “a court shall only disallow a suit by the
Commission if it is evident that the Commission failed to even undertake an
investigation” or failed to meet one of its other procedural prerequisites).
225. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-9 (incorporating 29 U.S.C. § 161 and thereby granting the
EEOC administrative subpoena power in conducting its investigations); EEOC v. Fed.
Express Corp., 558 F.3d 842, 854–56 (9th Cir. 2008) (observing that broad requests
at the outset of an investigation are necessary to allow the EEOC to draft future
requests for information from the employer).
226. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8 (conferring to the EEOC a broad right to access
relevant evidence); 29 C.F.R. § 1601.16 (supplying the EEOC with the power to
subpoena witnesses and witness testimony, documents and other records in the
possession or under the control of the person subpoenaed, and evidence for
examination and duplication); see also The Charge Handling Process, U.S. EQUAL EMP.
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, http://www.eeoc.gov/employers/process.cfm (last visited
Oct. 12, 2013) (communicating the duties and rights of the charging party and the
investigator after a charge has been filed against an employer).
227. See EEOC v. Caterpillar, Inc., 409 F.3d 831, 833 (7th Cir. 2005) (“The charge
incites the investigation, but if the investigation turns up additional violations the
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seek information related to potential systemic discrimination when
It can
investigating individual charges of discrimination.228
continue to investigate a charge even after the charging party has
settled with the employer and requested to withdraw the charge
of discrimination.229
At the end of the investigation, the EEOC must make a reasonable
cause determination via a letter of determination to the employer
and charging party.230 If the EEOC has found no reasonable cause
exists to support the charge, it dismisses the charge.231 The EEOC’s
reasonable cause determination (or no reasonable cause
determination) is not evidence of discrimination in any subsequent
litigation.232
“If the Commission determines . . . that there is
reasonable cause to believe that the charge is true, the Commission
shall endeavor to eliminate any such alleged unlawful employment
practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and
Commission can add them to its suit.”); see also EEOC v. Hearst Corp., Seattle PostIntelligencer Div., 553 F.2d 579, 580 (9th Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (clarifying that
even though an EEOC investigation was based on an underlying charge of individual
discrimination brought by a white male, the investigation uncovered evidence of
discrimination against women and minorities and that the EEOC was allowed to
litigate a claim on behalf of women and minorities); EEOC v. Gen. Elec. Co., 532
F.2d 359, 365 (4th Cir. 1976) (“The charge merely provides the EEOC with a
jurisdictional springboard to investigate whether the employer is engaged in any
discriminatory practices . . . .” (quoting EEOC v. Huttig Sash & Door Co., 511 F.2d
453, 455 (5th Cir. 1975)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
228. EEOC v. Konica Minolta Bus. Solutions U.S.A., Inc., 639 F.3d 366, 369 (7th
Cir. 2011) (“Racial discrimination is by definition class discrimination, and
information concerning whether an employer discriminated against other members
of the same class for the purposes of hiring or job classification may cast light on
whether an individual person suffered discrimination.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)); see also EEOC v. UPS, Inc., 587 F.3d 136, 137 (2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam)
(holding that the district court erred by refusing to enforce an EEOC administrative
subpoena seeking nationwide information on UPS employment guidelines).
229. See, e.g., EEOC. v. Watkins Motor Lines, Inc., 553 F.3d 593, 597 (7th Cir.
2009) (highlighting that the EEOC’s “powers are independent of any resolution
between employer and employee”); cf. Fed. Express Corp., 558 F.3d at 854 (holding
that the EEOC still had authority to issue an administrative subpoena even though it
had issued the employee a right to sue letter, and the employee had joined a class
action against FedEx).
230. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b); 29 C.F.R. § 1601.14(a).
231. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (“If the Commission determines after such an
investigation that there is not reasonable cause to believe that the charge is true, it
shall dismiss the charge and promptly notify the person claiming to be aggrieved and
the [employer] . . . .”). A finding of no reasonable cause does not preclude the
charging party (the employee) from filing suit; he or she may do so within ninety
days of the notice from the EEOC. Id. § 2000e-5(f)(1).
232. Gen. Elec. Co., 532 F.2d at 370 n.31 (“The Commission’s determination does
not establish rights or obligations; the [employer] is entitled to a trial de novo in the
district court.” (quoting EEOC v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 373 F. Supp. 1321,
1339 (D. Del. 1974))); see also Caterpillar, Inc., 409 F.3d at 833 (“The existence of
probable cause to sue is generally and in this instance not judicially reviewable.”);
Georator Corp. v. EEOC, 592 F.2d 765, 767 (4th Cir. 1979) (same).
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persuasion.”233 The EEOC may bring a lawsuit within thirty days after
the charge is filed if the EEOC cannot secure an acceptable
conciliation agreement from the employer.”234
The conciliation process offers the employer an opportunity to
resolve the charge confidentially and prior to public litigation.235 A
circuit split exists as to the amount of deference a district court must
give in subsequent EEOC litigation to the EEOC’s determination that
conciliation has failed. Courts that adopt the majority view—the
Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits, as well as nearly all district
courts within the Ninth Circuit—defer to the EEOC’s discretion and
find that the EEOC has met its conciliation obligation if it provides
the employer an opportunity to confront all the issues.236 Under this
standard, the EEOC must only make an attempt to conciliate, and the
acceptability of the terms of the conciliation is within the discretion
of the EEOC.237 The minority view, adopted by the Eleventh and
Fifth Circuits, examines the sufficiency of the conciliation process
and requires the EEOC to “(1) outline to the employer the
reasonable cause for its belief that Title VII has been violated; (2)
offer an opportunity for voluntary compliance; and (3) respond in a
233. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b).
234. Id. § 2000e-5(f)(1).
235. See id. § 2000e-5(b) (setting forth penalties for disclosing information
revealed during conciliation).
236. See, e.g., Serrano v. Cintas Corp., 699 F.3d 884, 905 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding
that “[t]he EEOC is under no duty to attempt further conciliation after an employer
rejects its offer” (quoting EEOC v. Keco Indus., Inc., 748 F.2d 1097, 1101–02 (6th
Cir. 1984))), cert. denied, No. 12-1347, 2013 WL 1951616 (Oct. 7, 2013); EEOC v.
Delight Wholesale Co., 973 F.2d 664, 669 (8th Cir. 1992) (same); EEOC v. Saint
Anne’s Hosp. of Chi., Inc., 664 F.2d 128, 131 (7th Cir. 1981) (same); EEOC v. Zia
Co., 582 F.2d 527, 533 (10th Cir. 1978) (stating that Title VII requires the EEOC to
seek conciliation, but “court[s] should not examine the details of offers and
counteroffers”); see also EEOC v. Timeless Invs., Inc., 734 F. Supp. 2d 1035, 1053–54
(E.D. Cal. 2010) (finding that the EEOC must attempt conciliation but the details of
the conciliation are not reviewable); EEOC v. Hometown Buffet, Inc., 481 F. Supp.
2d 1110, 1114–15 (S.D. Cal. 2007) (same); EEOC v. Scolari Warehouse Mkts., Inc.,
488 F. Supp. 2d 1117, 1129 (D. Nev. 2007) (same). However, at least one court in
the Ninth Circuit has reached a different conclusion. See EEOC v. La Rana Haw.,
LLC, 888 F. Supp. 2d 1019, 1046 (D. Haw. 2012) (staying the EEOC’s suit and
ordering the EEOC to “redo” conciliation with defendants because the EEOC had
not given the defendants “the number or identity of Claimants [or] . . . specific
instances of harassment or discrimination”).
237. See EEOC v. Prudential Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 763 F.2d 1166, 1169 (10th
Cir. 1985) (stating that the district court should only determine whether the EEOC
made an attempt at conciliation rather than judging the sufficiency of the
conciliation efforts); Keco Indus., 748 F.2d at 1102 (same); Saint Anne’s Hosp., 664
F.2d at 131 (same). Most of these courts do not require that the EEOC identify
particular class members or “disclose all of the underlying evidence or information
to the employer.” EEOC v. PBM Graphics Inc., 877 F. Supp. 2d 334, 361–62
(M.D.N.C. 2012) (quoting EEOC v. Cal. Psychiatric Transitions, Inc., 725 F. Supp. 2d
1100, 1115 (E.D. Cal. 2010)).
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reasonable and flexible manner to the reasonable attitudes of the
employer.”238 Further, under this view, if the court finds that the
EEOC did not conciliate in good faith, the court may stay later
litigation or even dismiss the EEOC’s suit and impose attorneys’
fees.239 The Second Circuit examines the sufficiency of the EEOC’s
conciliation efforts except where the employer “refuses the invitation
to conciliate or responds by denying the EEOC’s allegations, the
EEOC need not pursue conciliation and may proceed to litigate the
question of the employer’s liability for the alleged violations.”240
Despite the distinctive aspects of the EEOC’s investigative and
litigation authority, some courts have treated EEOC pattern or
practice claims similar to private class actions or even individual
claims. This treatment is demonstrated by recent decisions that
dismiss the EEOC’s pattern or practice claim and by decisions that
significantly limit the EEOC’s claim in terms of its scope or for whom
the EEOC can seek relief.241 For example, some courts have equated
the EEOC’s right to seek relief to that of the individuals for whom the
EEOC seeks the relief. In such instances, courts have held that
because individuals must file their charges of discrimination within
180 days of the discriminatory act,242 the EEOC cannot seek relief
for individuals against whom the discrimination occurred more
than 180 days prior to the filing of the charge that triggered the
EEOC’s investigation.243
238. EEOC v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 340 F.3d 1256, 1259 (11th Cir. 2003); see
also EEOC v. Agro Distrib., LLC, 555 F.3d 462, 468 (5th Cir. 2009) (noting that these
factors must be met to demonstrate that the EEOC made a good-faith attempt at
conciliation).
239. Agro Distrib., LLC, 555 F.3d at 469.
240. EEOC v. Johnson & Higgins, Inc., 91 F.3d 1529, 1535 (2d Cir. 1996)
(citations omitted).
241. Despite these restrictions, in FY 2012, the EEOC’s litigation docket saw its
largest number of systemic cases since the EEOC started collecting the data. See
SEYFARTH SHAW LLP, EEOC ABANDONS SHOTGUN APPROACH, FOCUSES ON SYSTEMIC
D ISCRIMINATION S UITS (2013), available at http://www.workplaceclassaction.com
/files/2013/07/EEOC-Infographic.pdf. The EEOC filed 122 merits suits, 20% of
which were systemic. Id. This was an increase of 14% and 13% from the previous
two years, respectively. Id. This may suggest that one of the reasons there have
recently been more decisions limiting the EEOC’s pattern or practice lawsuit is
simply that the EEOC has filed more pattern or practice suits.
242. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (2012). This 180-day time period lengthens to 300
days when a state or local agency is charged with enforcement of state antidiscrimination laws. Id.
243. See EEOC v. Presrite Corp., No. 11 CV 260, 2012 WL 3780351, at *4 (N.D.
Ohio Aug. 30, 2012) (“The EEOC is time-barred from challenging employment
decisions made by [the employer] more than 300 days prior to the Commissioner’s
charge . . . .”); EEOC v. PBM Graphics Inc., 877 F. Supp. 2d 334, 351–54 (M.D.N.C.
2012) (finding that when the EEOC seeks relief for individuals more than 180 days
before the triggering charge, the EEOC’s claims as to the individuals “are
presumptively barred and subject to dismissal”); EEOC v. Bass Pro Outdoor World,

MORRISON.OFF.TO.WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

DUKE-ING OUT PATTERN OR PRACTICE

11/2/2013 12:36 PM

129

Still other courts have placed limitations on the EEOC’s ability to
bring pattern or practice claims in ways that are inconsistent with the
legislative history and the EEOC’s role as a litigator in the public
interest. Some courts, for example, have found that the EEOC may
only bring a pattern or practice claim pursuant to section 707, and
that the EEOC is therefore limited to declaratory, injunctive, and
other equitable relief if it establishes a pattern or practice.244 To seek
individual relief under this view, the EEOC must allege individual
discrimination claims under section 706 and prove disparate
treatment as to each aggrieved individual.245 Further, other courts,
including the Eighth Circuit in EEOC v. CRST Van Expedited, Inc.,246
have found that to seek individual relief for persons harmed by the
pattern or practice, the EEOC must have given the employer an
opportunity to conciliate each aggrieved person’s claim during the
administrative processing.247 This Article next explains why courts
are misguided to treat EEOC claims as being identical to those of
LLC, 884 F. Supp. 2d 499, 523 (S.D. Tex. 2012) (concluding that “the EEOC is
bound by the 300 day limitations period”); cf. EEOC v. Global Horizons, Inc., 904 F.
Supp. 2d 1074, 1092 (D. Haw. 2012) (finding that “pattern-or-practice claims
brought by the EEOC under § 707 are in fact limited by the 300-day charge-filing
period set forth in § 706”).
244. See, e.g., EEOC v. IPS Indus., Inc., 899 F. Supp. 2d 507, 517 (N.D. Miss. 2012)
(explaining that because the EEOC brought its claims under section 706, the court
declined to consider the claims “in the aggregate” and instead “analyze[d] each class
member’s claim individually”); see also Bent, Systemic Harassment, supra note 9, at 185–
92 (arguing that only section 707 authorizes the EEOC to bring pattern or practice
claims, and it does not permit the EEOC to recover compensatory or punitive
damages). Some courts, however, have found that the EEOC may bring a pattern or
practice claim under section 706 as well. See, e.g., Serrano v. Cintas Corp., 699 F.3d
884, 894–96 (6th Cir. 2012) (reversing the lower court’s determination that the
EEOC could not proceed under the Teamsters framework in a sex discrimination case
because the EEOC had only asserted claims under section 706 in its complaint), cert.
denied, No. 12-1347, 2013 WL 1951616 (Oct. 7, 2013); EEOC v. Pitre, Inc., 908 F.
Supp. 2d 1165, 1174 (D.N.M. 2012) (permitting the EEOC to proceed using the
Teamsters framework for the pattern or practice claims it had alleged pursuant to
section 706 (citing Serrano, 699 F.3d at 894–96)).
245. See Bass Pro Outdoor World, 884 F. Supp. 2d at 518–21; see also EEOC v. Hotspur
Resorts Nev., Ltd., No. 2:10-cv-2265-RCJ-GWF, 2011 WL 4737409, at *4–5 (D. Nev.
Oct. 5, 2011) (recognizing that the EEOC may seek relief on behalf of a group of
aggrieved individuals without obtaining class certification, but nevertheless requiring
the EEOC to “plead the claims of each aggrieved person”).
246. 679 F.3d 657 (8th Cir. 2012).
247. See id. at 671–77 (holding that the trial court did not err in dismissing the
EEOC’s systemic discrimination claim under section 706 for failure to conciliate);
Bass Pro Outdoor World, 884 F. Supp. 2d at 521–22 (requiring the EEOC to plead that
conciliation efforts have failed as a condition precedent to its filing of a section 706
claim). One of the curious aspects of these decisions is that while the courts decide
that section 706 and section 707 are basically separate causes of action, such that the
EEOC cannot allege pattern or practice under section 706 or seek compensatory and
punitive damages if it alleges a section 707 violation, the courts still apply the
limitations period from section 706 to the EEOC’s section 707 pattern or practice
claim. See, e.g., id. at 518–20, 523.
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private litigants and how the EEOC’s public interest mission
elevates the Agency’s role to that of a “fist” in the Duke-out over the
pattern or practice.
V. THE EEOC AS FIST
A. The EEOC Enjoys Procedural Advantages in Litigation
The EEOC’s pattern or practice litigation is distinct from that of
private pattern or practice litigation because the EEOC enjoys three
important procedural advantages that private litigants do not: the
EEOC is not required to obtain class certification to bring a pattern
or practice claim, the EEOC’s claims are not subject to a statute of
limitations, and the EEOC may still bring suit in its own name even if
the victim of discrimination has agreed to mandatory arbitration.
In General Telephone Co. of the Northwest, Inc. v. EEOC,248 the Supreme
Court held that Title VII does not require the EEOC to obtain class
certification under Rule 23 to seek class-wide relief pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1).249 The EEOC brought a lawsuit against
General Telephone Company after it investigated charges of sex
discrimination filed by four female employees.250 The EEOC alleged
that the company’s practices discriminated on the basis of sex with
regard to maternity leave, access to certain classes of jobs, and
promotion to managerial positions.251 The EEOC sought injunctive
relief and backpay for the women affected by the discriminatory
practices.252 When the EEOC moved to “bifurcate[e] the issue of
class liability from the issue of individual damages,” General
Telephone Company opposed the bifurcation and moved to dismiss
the “class action aspects of the complaint.”253 The Court found
support for its holding that Rule 23 did not apply to EEOC
enforcement actions in the text of Title VII, the legislative history
surrounding the 1972 amendments, the enforcement procedures
prior to these amendments, and the distortions of common
interpretations of the Rule 23 requirements that would result if
EEOC actions were forced into the Rule 23 model.254 First, the Court
found that section 706(g) specifically authorizes the EEOC “to bring
suit in its own name for the purpose, among others, of securing relief
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.

446 U.S. 318 (1980).
Id. at 333–34.
Id. at 320.
Id. at 321.
Id.
Id. at 322 (internal quotation marks omitted).
See id. at 323–31.
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for a group of aggrieved individuals.”255 The EEOC’s “authority to
bring such actions is in no way dependent upon Rule 23, and the
Rule has no application to a § 706 suit.”256 The Court determined
that the language, “the Commission may bring a civil action,”257
authorized the EEOC to file suit258 and “to secure appropriate relief,
including ‘reinstatement or hiring . . . , with or without back pay,’
for the victims of the discrimination.”259 Further, the Court found
that the text of section 706(g) authorized the procedure by which
the EEOC had brought suit, i.e., investigating claims that the
General Telephone Company discriminated against female
employees, finding reasonable cause, and then filing suit to remedy
the discrimination.260
Second, the Court turned to the purpose of the 1972 amendments,
which the Court concluded “was to secure more effective
enforcement of Title VII.”261 Third, the Court determined that the
Attorney General’s authority to bring a pattern or practice suit under
section 707 without first obtaining class certification was transferred
to the EEOC through the 1972 amendments.262 Moreover, the
Attorney General could recover backpay for individuals and seek
individual injunctive relief such as reinstatement under section
707.263 Congress did not differentiate between the EEOC’s ability to
bring a class suit and that of the Attorney General’s prior to the
amendments.264 Nor did Congress limit the EEOC’s ability to seek
individual or class relief.265 According to the Court, because Congress
transferred the Attorney General’s authority to enforce Title VII in
federal court to the EEOC, and because the Attorney General “did
not sue as a representative of the persons aggrieved” and could
proceed without Rule 23 certification, “Congress intended the EEOC
to proceed in the same manner.”266

255. Id. at 324.
256. Id.
257. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (2012).
258. Gen. Tel. Co. of the Nw., 446 U.S. at 323–24.
259. Id. at 324 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)).
260. Id.
261. Id. at 325.
262. Id. at 327–29; see also supra text accompanying notes 194–202 (explaining that
prior to 1972, the U.S. Attorney General through the DOJ, rather than the EEOC,
had the authority to bring suit in federal court against employers under section 707).
263. Gen. Tel. Co. of the Nw., 446 U.S. at 327–28.
264. Id. at 328–29 (citing 118 CONG. REC. 4081–82 (1972)).
265. See id. at 329 n.12 (citing 118 CONG. REC. 4081).
266. Id. at 329.
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Fourth, the Court found that forcing the EEOC to seek Rule 23
certification would “distort” the Rule 23 model.267 The Court was
concerned that the Rule 23(a) requirements would force the EEOC
to join all aggrieved individuals in smaller cases, interfering with the
EEOC’s ability to bring suit in its own name.268 Similarly, the Court
determined that under Rule 23(a) the EEOC would have to stand in
the shoes of the charging party and thus be limited in its suit “to
claims typified by those of the charging party,” rather than any claim
that arose out of the investigation of the charge.269 Accordingly,
based on the legislative history and the EEOC’s role of litigating in
the public interest, the EEOC is not required to seek class
certification when bringing a pattern or practice claim.
The Court, in Occidental Life Insurance Co. v. EEOC,270 confirmed
that the EEOC also is not subject to any statute of limitations, unlike
private litigants who must receive a right to sue notice and file their
suit within ninety days of the notice.271 In 1970, a female employee of
Occidental Life Insurance Company filed a complaint of sex
discrimination with the EEOC.272 Three years and two months later,
the EEOC filed suit in federal district court in its own name.273 Prior
to filing suit, the EEOC had served the original charge of
discrimination on the company, investigated the charge, found cause,
and attempted conciliation.274
The district court granted
Occidental’s motion for summary judgment, reasoning that Title VII
required the EEOC to file suit within 180 days of a charge of
discrimination being filed with the EEOC, and alternatively that the
one-year state statute of limitations barred the suit.275 The Supreme
Court, affirming the Ninth Circuit’s reversal, held that the only
temporal restriction on the EEOC’s ability to bring an enforcement
action in federal district court is that “the EEOC may not invoke the
judicial power to compel compliance with Title VII until at least 30
days after a charge has been filed.”276 The Court relied on the
legislative history of the 1972 amendments and the purposes behind
Title VII to support its conclusion.277 It determined that Congress
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.

Id. at 329–30.
Id. at 330–31.
Id. at 331.
432 U.S. 355 (1977).
Id. at 361 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1)).
Id. at 357.
Id. at 358.
Id. at 357.
Id. at 358.
Id. at 360.
Id. at 366, 369.
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included the 180-day period to ensure the aggrieved individual’s
ability to pursue a prompt remedy in light of the Agency’s backlog of
cases and lack of resources, not as a temporal limitation on the
EEOC’s ability to bring suit.278 The lack of a statute of limitations
places the EEOC in a more advantageous position than that of private
litigants. One benefit is that the EEOC can marshal its evidence and,
as discussed below, develop a narrative that places the pattern or
practice of discrimination firmly within a legal theory well before
filing its complaint.279 It can also use the extra time to ensure the
employer has notice of its liability and to try to resolve the case prior
to filing suit.
Finally, in EEOC v. Waffle House Inc.,280 the Court held that the
EEOC may still bring an action even if the employee whose charge
formed the basis of the EEOC’s action had agreed to binding
arbitration.281 As a practical matter, the absence of three procedural
hurdles—class certification, statute of limitations, and mandatory
arbitration clauses—in EEOC pattern or practice litigation means
that the EEOC is in a better position to bring systemic claims than
private litigants who must seek class certification and are subject to a
statute of limitations and mandatory arbitration. These advantages
also mean that the EEOC may be the only plaintiff that can bring a
claim, particularly in light of the restrictions on the ability of private
plaintiffs to obtain class certification following AT&T Mobility LLC v.
Concepcion282 and Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes.283
B. The EEOC’s Position as an Agency Protects Employers’
Due Process Rights
The EEOC’s status as a federal agency protects employers’ due
process rights in ways that litigation by private litigants does not.
First, the EEOC’s administrative processing provides notice to
employers well in advance of any potential litigation. Second, the
EEOC’s political accountability means that employers who are
278. Id. at 369.
279. See infra notes 361–367 and accompanying text.
280. 534 U.S. 279 (2002).
281. Id. at 297–98.
282. 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1746, 1753 (2011); see Sternlight, supra note 70, at 88 (stating
that the Supreme Court’s decision in Concepcion “allows companies to use arbitration
clauses to insulate themselves from exposure to plaintiffs’ class actions”); Sternlight,
supra note 80, at 719–20 (explaining that “Concepcion and its progeny will affect
putative named plaintiffs by requiring them to pursue their claims individually in
arbitration rather than as part of a class in either litigation or arbitration”).
283. See supra Part III (discussing the challenges posed to systemic discrimination
claims by Wal-Mart).
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dissatisfied with its handling of a case or its enforcement efforts can
use the political process to advocate for their interests.
1.

Conditions precedent address concerns about notice for employers
The EEOC’s conditions precedent and administrative processing
put to rest any issues regarding whether an employer receives
adequate notice. The Fourth Circuit explained, that the EEOC’s
conditions precedent to bringing a lawsuit ensure, in part, that “the
employer is fully notified of the violation.”284 In contrast to a litigant
in a private pattern or practice suit, the EEOC must give notice to the
employer in a letter of determination and through the conciliation
process that the allegations are class-wide before it can bring a
pattern or practice suit in federal court.285 As a result, a defendant
would have the opportunity to gather and preserve evidence before it
grew stale.286
For example, in Serrano v. Cintas Corp.,287 the Sixth Circuit noted
the EEOC’s letter of determination that stated, “like and related
charges growing out of this investigation, there is reasonable cause to
believe that [Cintas] has discriminated against females as a class by
284. EEOC v. Am. Nat’l Bank, 652 F.2d 1176, 1185 (4th Cir. 1981); see also
Occidental Life Ins. Co., 432 U.S. at 372–73 (finding that the notice provided to
potential defendants of the charge and the course of the EEOC litigation relieved
the concerns that not imposing time limitations on the EEOC would prejudice Title
VII defendants and deprive them of due process by allowing stale claims); EEOC v.
Original Honeybaked Ham Co. of Ga., Inc. 918 F. Supp. 2d 1171, 1180 (D. Colo.
2013) (observing that because the EEOC had disclosed “the nature, extent, location,
time period, and persons involved in the alleged unlawful conduct,” the employer
was “able to reasonably estimate the number and identities of the persons who may
have been impacted,” and that the EEOC therefore did not have to disclose each
individual to later seek relief for that employee). In a recent case in Arizona, in
which it appears the EEOC was not alleging a pattern or practice claim but rather
asserting individual claims of discrimination, the district court dismissed twenty-one
claimants the EEOC identified during litigation because the EEOC had not disclosed
them during conciliation. EEOC v. Swissport Fueling, Inc., 916 F. Supp. 2d 1005,
1044 (D. Ariz. 2013). The outcome likely would have been different—or at least
should have been different—if the EEOC had proceeded under a pattern or practice
claim, which would not have required the EEOC to identify each individual affected
by the practice, but merely required it to identify the pattern or practice at issue.
285. See, e.g., Occidental Life Ins. Co., 432 U.S. at 359–60, 368 (indicating that the
EEOC cannot assert a claim in federal court without first “discharg[ing] its
administrative duties” of notice, investigation, reasonable cause determination, and
conciliation); see also Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 290 n.7 (“Unlike individual
employees, the EEOC cannot pursue a claim in court without first engaging in a
conciliation process.”).
286. Occidental Life Ins. Co., 432 U.S. at 372; see also EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S.
54, 79 (1984) (noting that, in addition to ensuring that relevant records are not
destroyed, notice to the employer of a pattern or practice charge also allows the
employer “to undertake its own inquiry into its employment practices”).
287. 699 F.3d 884 (6th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, No. 12-1347, 2013 WL 1951616
(Oct. 7, 2013).
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failing to hire them as Route Sales Drivers/Service Sales
Representatives in violation of Title VII,” and as well as similar
language in the EEOC’s offer of conciliation, provided notice to the
employer of the class-wide claims giving it an opportunity to
conciliate the claims before suit.288 Some courts have gone further by
requiring the EEOC to identify each victim of the discriminatory
practice during the administrative processing and to provide the
employer an opportunity to conciliate as to each individual and by
prohibiting the EEOC from uncovering additional class members
through discovery.289
These procedural requirements are in contrast to those in the
private class action context. In United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald,290 the
Supreme Court considered whether an individual who did not file a
charge of discrimination could intervene after the lower court had
dismissed a private suit seeking class certification.291 Until 1968,
United Airlines policy required its female flight attendants to remain
unmarried but did not require the same of men.292 A female
employee, Mary Sprogis, filed a charge with the EEOC alleging
individual discrimination, and after receiving her notice of right to
sue, brought an individual lawsuit in federal court.293 She won.294
While United was appealing the case, another female employee,
Carole Romasanta, filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC
alleging United had fired her because she had married.295
When Ms. Romasata filed suit in federal court, unlike Ms. Sprogis,
she filed her suit as a class action even though she had filed an

288. Id. at 904.
289. See, e.g., EEOC v. CRST Van Expedited, Inc., 679 F.3d 657, 674–75 (8th Cir.
2012) (stating that the EEOC may seek relief for individuals it identifies during the
course of investigation, but an employer must have an opportunity to conciliate with
those individuals). As previously mentioned, the Eighth Circuit in CRST did not
treat the EEOC’s claim as a pattern or practice claim and instead assumed that when
the EEOC alleges a section 706 violation, it must prove up each victim’s individual
disparate treatment claim. See supra notes 208, 246–247 and accompanying text.
Nonetheless, this view seems inconsistent with General Telephone Co. of the Northwest
and Waffle House, see supra Part V.A and infra Part V.E, as well as the nature of class
allegations. Not even a private class action claim under Rule 23(b)(3) must name
each potential class member pre-certification or even before a determination of
liability on a Teamsters-style claim. Further, private class action claimants are allowed
to seek additional class members through discovery and the post-judgment class
notification process.
290. 432 U.S. 385 (1977).
291. Id. at 387.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id. at 387–88.
295. Id. at 388.
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individual charge of discrimination with the EEOC.296 The district
court denied the certification, and the case was later settled, leading
the court to dismiss the suit.297 A third female employee, Liane
McDonald, who had not filed a charge of discrimination with the
EEOC, found out about the dismissal of the suit and sought
intervention to appeal the denial of class certification.298 The district
court denied intervention because of the length of time (five years)
that had passed since Ms. Romasanta had filed her suit.299 After the
Seventh Circuit reversed, United petitioned for and was granted
certiorari, whereupon the Supreme Court upheld the Seventh Circuit
decision.300 The key issue for the Court was that Ms. McDonald could
not even appeal the denial of class certification until the judgment
was final, making her motion for intervention timely.301 However, in
addressing whether intervention would prejudice United, the Court
found that because Ms. Romasata had filed her suit as a class action,
“United was put on notice . . . of the possibility of classwide
liability.”302 Therefore, the EEOC’s litigation of pattern or practice
claims provides better and earlier notice to employers than private
class action claims because the EEOC must let the employer know
during the administrative processing that it is investigating, has
reasonable cause to believe, and seeks to conciliate a pattern or
practice claim.
2.

As an agency, the EEOC has political accountability
The EEOC is an independent agency, yet it is politically
accountable. Congress can provide a check on the EEOC’s actions in
a number of ways should the Agency abuse employers’ process rights.
Congress can exercise some control over the EEOC both through its
oversight function and through the annual budget resolution and
appropriations process.303 The EEOC also must follow public notice
296. Id.
297. Id. at 388–89.
298. Id. at 389–90.
299. Id. at 390.
300. Id. at 395–96.
301. Id.
302. Id. at 395.
303. Congressional Oversight, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, http://www
.eeoc.gov/eeoc/legislative/oversight.cfm (last visited Oct. 12, 2013); see also Elena
Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2258 (2001) (describing a
fire alarm system backed by “powerful legislative sanctions” through which Congress
exercises control over federal agencies and which allows “citizens and interest groups
to monitor an agency and report any perceived errors” (internal quotation marks
omitted)). Recently, Republican members of the House Education and the
Workforce’s Subcommittee on Workforce Protections questioned the EEOC Chair,
Jacqueline Berrien, about the EEOC’s litigation authority and the EEOC’s litigation
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and comment rules before enacting new regulations.304 Such
accountability is not present for private litigants.
For example, in the mid-1990s, the EEOC launched an
investigation into the hiring practices of the Hooters restaurant
chain, resulting in a finding that the restaurant discriminated on the
basis of sex (male) in hiring.305 After receiving a conciliation offer
from the EEOC that it found unacceptable, Hooters went public and
engaged in an extensive media campaign.306 Employees of Hooters
even marched on Washington.307 As a result of Hooters’ public
relations effort, “Congress was flooded ‘with hundreds and hundreds
of letters,’” and “the controversy prompted a congressional inquiry
into the [investigation].”308 The largely negative public reaction to
the investigation of Hooters likely led to the EEOC’s letter to
Representative Harris Fawell, the then-Chairman of the House
Subcommittee on Employer-Employee Relations, announcing its
intention to withdraw the charge.309

priorities. Kevin P. McGowan, House Panel Quizzes EEOC’s Berrien About Recent
Developments at Agency, 99 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 99, at AA-1, (May 22, 2013)
(reporting that members questioned the delegation of litigation authority to the
EEOC General Counsel, the EEOC’s focus on systemic cases, and the EEOC’s
guidelines regarding the use of arrest and conviction records by employers).
304. Kagan, supra note 303, at 2262 (stating that the Administrative Procedure Act
subjects agency rulemaking “to stringent procedural requirements” and that later
“enhancement of these procedures . . . provide[d] still greater public participatory
rights”). For examples of some of the EEOC’s more recent proposed rulemakings
and requests for public input, see EEOC Regulations, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY
COMMISSION, http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/regulations/index.cfm (last visited Oct. 12,
2013). Besides the rulemaking process for enacting regulations, the EEOC also
engages in a process of public notice and comment for internal operations
documents like its most recent strategic plan. EEOC STRATEGIC PLAN FOR FY 2012–
2016, supra note 11, at 1, 4–5.
305. Kenneth L. Schneyer, Hooting: Public and Popular Discourse About Sex
Discrimination, 31 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 551, 567–68 (1998). The EEOC did not
release information about its investigation or its eventual conciliation offer because
of the statutory provision prohibiting such disclosure, and so all of the information
about the investigation and settlement offer came from Hooters’s press kit. Id. at 568
& n.68.
306. Id. at 568; see also Jeannie Sclafani Rhee, Redressing for Success: The Liability of
Hooters Restaurant for Customer Harassment of Waitresses, 20 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 163, 165
n.7 (1997) (“Hooters itself launched a successful media campaign against the EEOC,
culminating in an advertisement taken out in major newspapers, mocking the EEOC
with a picture of an unshaven man dressed up as a ‘Hooters Girl.’ The caption read
in part, ‘Washington—Get a Grip!’”).
307. Russell K. Robinson, Casting and Caste-Ing: Reconciling Artistic Freedom and
Antidiscrimination Norms, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 43 (2007).
308. Id. at 42; Chuck Hutchcraft, Hooters Case Won’t Get a Second Look: EEOC
Chairman Cites Limited Resources, CHI. TRIB. (May 2, 1996), http://articles.chicagotribune
.com/1996-05-02/business/9605020273_1_hooters-girls-hooters-restaurants-eeoc
(internal quotation marks omitted).
309. Schneyer, supra note 305, at 568 & n.72, 575. In the letter, the EEOC stated
that it had made the decision due to limited resources and the fact that a private
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Similarly, Congress can express its approval or disapproval of the
EEOC’s enforcement goals through its control of the EEOC’s budget.
In 2012, for example, the House Appropriations Committee
approved an amendment to its appropriations bill for the EEOC that
prohibited the EEOC from using any of its funds to enforce the
EEOC’s regulations concerning the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act due to the burden the regulations imposed on
businesses.310 The Senate Appropriations Committee did not include
a similar amendment in its appropriations bill, but it expressed
concern over the EEOC’s guidance on employers’ use of criminal
background checks because it could “limit the ability of conscientious
employers to hire with confidence.”311
The EEOC’s policy is to refuse to enter settlements post-suit that
contain confidentiality provisions, in part, to maintain its political
accountability.312 The EEOC’s Regional Attorneys’ Manual provides
that “[t]he principle of openness in government dictates that
Congress, the media, stakeholders, and the general public should
have access to the results of the agency’s litigation activities, so that
they can assess whether the Commission is using its resources
appropriately and effectively.”313 This includes the ability of the
EEOC to fully answer inquiries about its activities post-litigation and
to provide all non-privileged case-related documents.314
This is in contrast to the private, plaintiffs’ bar, which lacks the
“institutional commitment to civil rights enforcement and
nondiscrimination” and “may be tempted to compromise
organizational change for larger money settlement funds with the
hope of signaling greater success and leading to judicial approval of
larger attorneys’ fees.”315 The EEOC’s political accountability, then,
class action had been filed in the case, obviating the need for EEOC involvement.
Robinson, supra note 307, at 42–43.
310. Ilyse Wolens Schuman, House Committee Approves EEOC Budget with Amendment
Blocking ADEA Rule, LITTLER MENDELSON (Apr. 30, 2012), http://www.littler.com/dcemployment-law-update/house-committee-approves-eeoc-budget-amendment-blocking
-adea-rule.
311. Id.; cf. Christopher J. DeGroff & Gerald R. Maatman, Jr., Budget Woes May
Significantly Impact EEOC—But Should Employers Worry Too?, LEXOLOGY (Feb. 1, 2013),
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=653ce773-c51b-4865-bf6c-c18b3f0eafe5
(explaining that although Congress may limit the EEOC’s budget, employers should
still be cautious because the Agency has placed an emphasis on bringing large-scale
claims and partnering with other agencies).
312. U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, REGIONAL ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, pt.
3, § IV.A.2.e (2005) [hereinafter EEOC REGIONAL ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL], available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/litigation/manual/upload/regional_attorney_fullversio
n.pdf.
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. Green, supra note 6, at 717. The EEOC has experienced its own issues in
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should reassure courts that the risk of “in terrorem” settlement suits
or interference with businesses’ ability to run their business as they
see fit would not be present in an EEOC suit.316
C. EEOC Litigation Provides Enhanced Due Process Protections to
Employees and Employers
Unlike the unnamed class members in a Rule 23(b)(2) class, who
will be bound by the mandatory nature of the suit, potential
claimants in an EEOC action have several procedural protections.
First, employees who file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC
may intervene as of right in the EEOC’s subsequent lawsuit.317
Intervenors may allege additional claims, including state claims, and
make different requests for relief.318 This addresses, in part, concerns
about commonality and the risk that class members with higher value
claims will have their claims unfairly discounted by class counsel and
the named plaintiffs.319 The EEOC also operates under its own set of
implementing a program to address systemic litigation, including administrative
backlog in processing charges of discrimination, which has narrowed the EEOC’s
focus to individual discrimination rather than systemic discrimination in both
investigation and litigation. Id. at 679–80. There are signs that the EEOC is
successfully addressing these concerns beginning with its Systemic Initiative in 2006
and its reaffirmation this year in the EEOC Strategic Plan for FY 2012–2016 and the
EEOC Strategic Enforcement Plan for FY 2013–2016. See infra notes 352–354 and
accompanying text (explaining that the EEOC’s commitment to combating systemic
discrimination is a top priority); see also DeGroff & Maatman, supra note 311
(warning employers that the EEOC’s Systematic Initiative has resulted in lawsuits
with greater numbers of claimants and bigger damages).
316. At the same time, the EEOC should maintain its status as an independent
agency and Congress should be wary of placing the kind of political pressure on the
EEOC that will overly politicize the Agency and make it too accountable to special
interests. Rather than leading to greater political accountability, politicization has
led to polarization in the Agency confirmation process that increases executive
control over the Agency. Neal Devins & David E. Lewis, Not-So Independent Agencies:
Party Polarization and the Limits of Institutional Design, 88 B.U. L. REV. 459, 491 (2008).
This in turn can affect “the agency’s annual regulatory agenda submissions [because]
agencies ‘tend not to put on those lists things that are controversial, because if you
do, then you’re going to get problems.’” Kirti Datla & Richard L. Revesz,
Deconstructing Independent Agencies (and Executive Agencies), 98 CORNELL L. REV. 769, 823
(2013) (quoting Symposium, Independent Agencies—Independent from Whom?, 41 ADMIN.
L. REV. 491, 504 (1989) (statement of R. Gaull Silberman, former Vice-Chairman,
EEOC))).
317. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (2012) (“The person or persons aggrieved shall
have the right to intervene in a civil action brought by the Commission . . . .”).
318. See, e.g., EEOC v. Coley’s No. 101, Ltd. Liab. Co., No. 11-CV-3465-VEH, 2012
WL 2856512, at *7 (N.D. Ala. July 9, 2012) (permitting two individual plaintiffs to
intervene in the EEOC’s lawsuit alleging a pattern or practice of sexual harassment
and bring separate individualized claims against the defendant). But see EEOC v. JBS
USA, L.L.C., No. 8:10CV318, 2012 WL 5906537, at *9 (D. Neb. Nov. 26, 2012)
(denying intervention by plaintiffs in Phase I of the EEOC’s suit, upon plaintiffs’
seeking to assert individual rights but permitting intervention in Phase II should the
EEOC prove the pattern or practice).
319. One of the reasons that plaintiffs may intervene in EEOC lawsuits is to
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internal guidelines designed to protect the interests of individual
victims of discrimination and to make sure that they are aware of
their individual interests and rights.320 Before filing suit, EEOC
attorneys should interview potential claimants, and may seek
nonpecuniary compensatory damages “only for individuals who have
given their express consent following a thorough discussion with a
legal unit attorney regarding the possible consequences of such a
claim, and who have had at least a week to think about the matter.”321
The attorney should also discuss the EEOC’s “public interest role in
the litigation, the possibility that the Commission’s and the claimant’s
interests may diverge during the litigation, and the claimant’s
individual suit and intervention rights.”322
Second, if the EEOC reaches a settlement with the employer, the
court must approve the settlement, and the consent decree is
public.323 And, although the EEOC is not subject to Rule 23, when
the settlement includes a class fund, the EEOC will often request a
fairness hearing.324 A fairness hearing is a public hearing, held by the
district court, in which the district court determines the “fairness,
adequacy, and reasonableness” of the proposed settlement and

protect their individual claims of relief because the EEOC must pursue the public
interest through its litigation. In General Telephone Co. of the Northwest, the Court
specifically noted that intervention as of right was granted because the EEOC seeks
“the most satisfactory overall relief,” which involves weighing competing interests and
considering the potential for “particular groups . . . to be disadvantaged.” Gen. Tel.
Co. of the Nw., v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 331 (1980). Indeed, the Court noted that the
EEOC’s mission to act in the public interest means it must make “the hard choices
where conflicts of interest exist.” Id.
320. See generally EEOC REGIONAL ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 312.
321. Id. pt. 2, § II.C.
322. Id.
323. See EEOC v. Erection Co., 900 F.2d 168, 172 (9th Cir. 1990) (Reinhardt, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[T]he public has a right to know
whether the courts are properly resolving discrimination claims. Since it is
important for people to be able to assess the conduct of public institutions, the
presumption weighs even more heavily in favor of public access than in the ordinary
civil case.”); EEOC v. Hiram Walker & Sons, Inc., 768 F.2d 884, 889 (7th Cir. 1985)
(“[A] district court must determine whether a proposed decree is lawful, fair,
reasonable, and adequate.”); see also EEOC REGIONAL ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note
312, pt. 3, § IV.A.2.e (stating that resolutions of Commission suits must be filed in the
public court record).
324. See, e.g., EEOC v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 6:01-CV-339-KKC, 2011 WL
6400160, at *4 (E.D. Ky. Dec. 20, 2011) (stating that the court held a fairness hearing
to determine how the settlement would be distributed); EEOC v. Polycon, Indus.,
No. 2:09-CV-141, 2011 WL 4816230, at *1 (N.D. Ind. Oct. 11, 2011) (same); EEOC v.
Astra USA, Inc., No. CIV.A. 98-40014-NMG, 1999 WL 342043, at *1–2 (D. Mass. May
20, 1999) (same); see also EEOC REGIONAL ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 312, pt. 3,
§ IV.A.2.f, C, D.4 (noting that it may be appropriate to request a fairness hearing
before the court approves a consent decree and describing the procedures involved
in doing so).
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consent decree.325 The EEOC will request a fairness hearing, in part,
because it can “generate publicity, which can serve several important
functions, including reaching ‘lost’ aggrieved persons.”326 The
fairness hearing can also be beneficial to defendants, as resolution
through a fairness hearing “may diminish the likelihood of further
litigation by anyone who is included in the definition of persons who
can recover under the decree.”327
Third, because the EEOC cannot recover attorneys’ fees and all
monetary relief goes directly to the individuals subject to the pattern
or practice,328 the concerns over EEOC counsel padding their pockets
to benefit themselves to the detriment of the classes’ recovery is
nonexistent. Moreover, the EEOC foots the bill for depositions,
expert witnesses, and other litigation costs, which means not only are
those costs not deducted from the class members’ eventual recovery,
but EEOC counsel is also free to conduct the discovery necessary for
the case and to engage in robust pre-trial litigation.329 Indeed, at least
one court has commented that “extensive motion practice and
discovery” is indicative of a lack of fraud or collusion in the
settlement of the class.330
Fourth, when the EEOC settles a claim that involves class-based
relief, it treats the class as an opt-in class and tries to provide notice of
the settlement to all aggrieved individuals.331 Besides a copy of the
proposed consent decree, the EEOC includes in its notice to “all
persons covered by or affected by the lawsuit” a statement regarding
the claims in the lawsuit, an explanation of the EEOC’s efforts to
resolve the lawsuit, an explanation as to why the particular person
received the notices, a summary of the relief included in the decree,
an explanation of how the EEOC computed damages and
determined their allocation, the steps an aggrieved individual must
take to claim relief under the settlement, and notice of any fairness
325. Binker v. Pennsylvania, 977 F.2d 738, 748 (3d Cir. 1992); see also id. at 743–44
(describing the fairness hearing that took place in district court and examined the
EEOC’s proposed settlement and consent decree).
326. EEOC REGIONAL ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 312, pt. 3, § IV.D.4.
327. Id.
328. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (2012).
329. See EEOC REGIONAL ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 312, pt. 4, § I (discussing
how to obtain expert and other litigation support services, such as court reporters,
copying services, or process servers); cf. Sternlight, supra note 70, at 122
(“Government agencies can also protect consumers in situations where extensive
resources are needed to present and prove a claim. They can hire experts, gather
data, analyze statistics, and so on.”).
330. EEOC. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 6:01-CV-339-KKC, 2011 WL 6400160, at
*7 (E.D. Ky. Dec. 20, 2011).
331. See EEOC REGIONAL ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 312, pt. 3, § IV.D
(discussing the EEOC’s notice and claims procedures in the settlement of class claims).
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hearing and how to object to the settlement.332 Additionally, the
EEOC will provide notice of the settlement through other means
such as newspaper advertisements, a posting at the employer’s
facility or union hall, or on the internet (including on the
EEOC’s website).333
Nor are all individuals who were affected by the illegal employment
action necessarily bound by “EEOC judgment or settlement against
the employer.”334 That EEOC lawsuits do not have the same preclusive
effect as private class actions, is necessary “given the possible differences
between the public and private interests involved.”335 It is one of the
reasons that the Court in General Telephone of the Northwest found
the EEOC was exempt from the requirements of Rule 23(a). 336
The Court recognized that “the EEOC is authorized to proceed
in a unified action and to obtain the most satisfactory overall
relief even though competing interests are involved.”337 Indeed,
“[t]he individual victim is given [the] right to intervene for this
very reason.”338
The EEOC has also instructed its attorneys that any “consent
decree should never contain language waiving [individual claimants’]
rights to pursue their individual claims” since the EEOC does not
represent them.339 And, if the EEOC reached conciliation with the
employer prior to filing a lawsuit, an employee who was not a party to
the conciliation and did not receive individual relief from the
conciliation, is not proscribed from filing her own charge of
discrimination or suit.340 Nonetheless, employers are still protected
from having to pay out double recoveries to individuals.341 Anyone
332. Id. pt. 3, § IV.D.1.
333. Id. pt. 3, § IV.D.1.a. See www.eeoc.gov for postings of recent EEOC
settlement notices.
334. Gen. Tel. Co. of the Nw., v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 333 (1980).
335. Id.
336. Id. at 331.
337. Id.
338. Id.
339. EEOC REGIONAL ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 312, pt. 3, § IV.A.2.c.
340. See, e.g., Reed v. Arlington Hotel Co., 476 F.2d 721, 724–25 (8th Cir. 1973)
(finding that even though the EEOC and the employer had entered into a
settlement agreement, it did not prevent an employee who rejected relief under the
agreement from bringing his own claim); Domingo v. New England Fish Co., 445 F.
Supp. 421, 424–25 (W.D. Wash. 1977) (noting that the employee, who was not a
party to the conciliation agreement between the EEOC and employer, was able to file
suit in federal court), aff’d 743 F.2d 520 (9th Cir. 1984).
341. Gen. Tel. Co. of the Nw., 446 U.S. at 333; see also EEOC v. Mitsubishi Motor,
Mfg. of Am., Inc., 990 F. Supp. 1059, 1088 (C.D. Ill. 1998) (explaining that although
individuals who had filed their own lawsuit in federal court would be part of the
EEOC’s pattern or practice claim, they could not continue “to the individual relief
stage[] if the pattern or practice case is successful”).
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who receives relief pursuant to a judgment in an EEOC lawsuit also
“relinquish[es] his right to bring a separate private action.”342 This
addresses due process concerns for both employees and employers.
Employees with higher value claims are not forced to give up their
right to full recovery, while employers can be assured that if someone
obtains relief through an EEOC suit, the employer will not be forced
to defend itself again in a separate action.
Finally, just as private class action claims can provide protection to
class members who fear retaliation or the emotional costs of coming
forward, EEOC litigation can provide similar protections to class
members. As the Supreme Court has noted, the EEOC may file a
charge of discrimination to instigate an investigation “when a victim
of discrimination is reluctant to file a charge himself because of fear
of retaliation.”343 Further, at least one court has allowed individuals
to intervene anonymously in an EEOC pattern or practice claim.344
In EEOC v. ABM Industries Inc.,345 the EEOC alleged that the company
engaged in a pattern or practice of subjecting employees to a hostile
work environment based on sex.346 Eight women sought permission
of the court to intervene anonymously in the suit because not only
did they fear “embarrass[ment]” given the sexual nature of the
allegations, but they also feared retaliation and “serious physical
harm” at the hands of one of the company’s employees whom they
alleged was a registered sex offender and had sexually assaulted three
of the women in the workplace.347 The court noted that the women
were vulnerable to retaliation because of the allegations that the
harasser “was afforded access to them at the workplace as a
consequence of his job as a supervisor.”348 EEOC litigation, then, can
342. Gen. Tel. Co. of the Nw., 446 U.S. at 333.
343. EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 62 (1984) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(b)
(1982); 29 C.F.R. §§ 1601.7, 1601.11 (1983)). The EEOC has also adopted as one of
its national priorities the protection of vulnerable workers, including migrant and
immigrant workers. See U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, STRATEGIC
ENFORCEMENT PLAN FOR FY 2013–2016, at 1 (2012) [hereinafter EEOC STRATEGIC
ENFORCEMENT PLAN FOR FY 2013–2016], available at http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/plan
/upload/sep.pdf (stating that “[t]he EEOC will target disparate pay, job segregation,
harassment, trafficking and discriminatory policies affecting vulnerable workers who
may be unaware of their rights under the equal employment laws, or reluctant or
unable to exercise them”).
344. See EEOC v. ABM Indus. Inc., 249 F.R.D. 588, 590, 593–94 (E.D. Cal. 2008)
(acknowledging the claimants’ concerns that they may suffer embarrassment or face
a danger of serious physical injury if their identities were disclosed).
345. 249 F.R.D. 588 (E.D. Cal. 2008).
346. Id. at 590.
347. Id. at 593–94.
348. Id. at 594. In another case, EEOC v. Scolari Warehouse Markets, Inc., the
defendant argued that because the EEOC had only named seventeen women who
alleged they suffered a hostile work environment based on sex in a company with
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provide enhanced protections to employees and employers that often
are not available in private litigation.
D. The EEOC’s Institutional Role Gives It Expertise in Pattern or Practice
Litigation
When Congress amended Title VII in 1972 to expand the EEOC’s
enforcement authority, it did so because there was “a need for an
administrative agency with acknowledged expertise in the area of
discrimination.”349 Part of what motivated Congress to recognize this
was the systemic nature of discrimination:
Congress was aware that employment discrimination was a
“complex and pervasive” problem that could be extirpated only
with thoroughgoing remedies; “[u]nrelenting broad-scale action
against patterns or practices of discrimination” was essential if the
purposes of Title VII were to be achieved. The EEOC, because
“[i]t has access to the most current statistical computations and
analyses regarding employment patterns” was thought to be in the
best position “to determine where ‘pattern or practice’ litigation is
warranted” and to pursue it.350

In General Telephone Company of the Southwest v. Falcon, the Court
emphasized Title VII’s recognition of the EEOC’s “special
authorization” to remedy systemic discrimination by pointing to the
statute’s different treatment of suits brought by the EEOC as
compared to those brought by private individuals:

5,200 employees, the EEOC could not demonstrate that the defendant had engaged
in a pattern or practice of subjecting female employees to a hostile work
environment. 488 F. Supp. 2d 1117, 1130 (D. Nev. 2007). The court rejected the
argument, recognizing that only seventeen employees may have stepped forward
because the rest feared retaliation, and accepted as true for purposes of the summary
judgment motion that there was a class of unnamed women for whom the EEOC
sought relief. Id. at 1130–31.
349. Hart, supra note 9, at 1952. Professor Hart also notes that when the Court
has rejected the EEOC’s interpretation of statutes, thereby ignoring the EEOC’s
expertise, Congress has reacted by “revers[ing] the Court’s decisions and
essentially . . . enact[ing] the EEOC’s interpretation directly into law.” Id. at 1950.
Since Professor Hart’s article, Congress enacted the Lily Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of
2009 in reaction to the Court’s rejection of the EEOC’s interpretation of a
discriminatory act in pay in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618,
(2007), Lily Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111–2 § 2, 123 Stat. 5, 5.
This provides further support for Professor Hart’s contention that Congress views the
EEOC as having expertise in interpreting Title VII.
350. EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 69 (1984) (footnote omitted) (quoting
H.R. REP. NO. 92-238, at 8, 14 (1971)); see also Hart, supra note 9, at 1952 (stating that
employment discrimination as viewed today is a far more “complex and pervasive”
phenomenon, one whose resolution requires expert assistance and technical
perception that the problem exists in the first place and the system complained of is
unlawful (quoting S. Rep. No. 92-415, at 5 (1971))).
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[T]he Commission may seek relief for groups of employees or
applicants for employment without complying with the strictures of
Rule 23. Title VII, however, contains no special authorization for
class suits maintained by private parties. An individual litigant
seeking to maintain a class action under Title VII must meet “the
prerequisites of numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy
of representation” specified in Rule 23(a).351

The EEOC’s institutional role in addressing pattern or practices of
discrimination was specifically contemplated by Congress and
reaffirmed by the Supreme Court as having special authorization.
As an agency, the EEOC recently has recommitted itself to that
role. In 2006, the EEOC adopted a Systemic Initiative that “makes
the identification, investigation, and litigation of systemic
discrimination cases—pattern or practice, policy, and/or class cases
where the alleged discrimination has a broad impact on an industry,
profession, company, or geographic area—a top priority.”352 The
Initiative recognized the unique position the EEOC occupies in
combating systemic discrimination.353 The EEOC reaffirmed its
commitment to its Systemic Initiative through its Strategic Plan for
Fiscal Years 2012–2016 and its Strategic Enforcement Plan for Fiscal
Years 2013–2016.354
The EEOC also has internal units to provide analytic support for
pattern or practice claims.355 One unit, Research and Analytic
Services (RAS) focuses on providing support for large, complex
pattern or practice claims in litigation.356 The other unit, the Office
of Research, Information and Planning (“ORIP”) provides support
during the investigation of systemic cases and administers the Equal
351. Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 156 (1982) (citations
omitted) (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of Nw. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 330 (1980)).
352. EEOC STRATEGIC PLAN FOR FY 2012–2016, supra note 11, at 14; see also LESLIE
E. SILVERMAN ET AL., SYSTEMIC TASK FORCE REPORT TO THE CHAIR OF THE EQUAL
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION (2006) [hereinafter EEOC SYSTEMIC INITIATIVE],
available at http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/task_reports/upload/systemic.pdf (providing
recommendations to ensure a coordinated strategic and nationwide program to
combat systemic discrimination).
353. See EEOC SYSTEMIC INITIATIVE, supra note 352, at 2 (recognizing that the
EEOC’s access to substantial data regarding employment discrimination allegations
provides the Agency with a unique ability to identify potential systemic cases).
354. See EEOC STRATEGIC ENFORCEMENT PLAN FOR FY 2013–2016, supra note 343, at
7–8; EEOC STRATEGIC PLAN FOR FY 2012–2016, supra note 11, at 14 (pointing to
enforcement priorities as originating with the Systemic Initiative).
355. See EEOC REGIONAL ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 312, pt. 4, § I.B–C
(outlining services provided by the Research and Analytic Services and the Office of
Research, Information and Planning).
356. See id. pt. 4, § I.B.1 (describing RAS senior staff as consisting typically of social
scientists with advanced degrees, such as psychologists, economists, statisticians, and
social scientists, who are highly skilled in managing large computerized data).
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Employment Opportunity Survey programs (“EEO surveys”).357 ORIP
provides the data it collects from the EEO surveys to Commissioners,
Congress, local fair employment practice agencies, and the public.358
From October 1, 2011 through September 30, 2012, the EEOC
received 71,578 charges alleging discrimination under Title VII.359
This places the EEOC in the role of “serv[ing] as the national
repository for virtually all formal allegations of employment
discrimination brought under federal law.”360 Combined with its
access to data through the EEO surveys, the EEOC’s ability to employ
a wide variety of investigative tools means that the Agency can identify
and investigate potential pattern or practices of discrimination.361
For example, unlike private litigants who have access only to their
own administrative processing files, the EEOC is able to look at and
review the evidence in all the charges it receives.362 Without such
information, the private litigant is not only hampered in his ability to
file a complaint in federal court alleging sufficient facts for a pattern
or practice, but also might not even realize that his allegation of
discrimination was not an isolated instance. In contrast, the EEOC
can expand the scope of its investigation and even pursue
enforcement of a subpoena seeking additional information to

357. See id. pt. 4, § I.C. (describing the Survey Program as requiring “[n]early
every employer in the United States with 100 or more employees . . . to file an Equal
Employment Survey with the Commission”).
358. Id.
359. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 Charges, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY
COMMISSION, www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/titlevii.cfm (last visited Oct.
12, 2013).
360. EEOC SYSTEMIC INITIATIVE, supra note 352, at 2.
361. Id. (“The agency has access to substantial data, including information on
employment trends and demographic changes, that can help identify possible
systemic discrimination. . . . This information, combined with the Commission’s
ability to use either a Commissioner Charge . . . or a Directed Investigation . . .
provides the EEOC with the crucial tools needed to uncover systemic employment
discrimination.”); see also EEOC STRATEGIC ENFORCEMENT PLAN FOR FY 2013–2016,
supra note 343, at 13 (listing the “wide range of enforcement tools at the EEOC’s
disposal, including investigations, mediation, conciliation, litigation, directed
investigations, commissioners charges, amicus curiae participation, federal sector
oversight, federal sector hearings and appeals, policy development, research, staff
training, communications, outreach and education, and state, local, and federal
agency collaboration”).
362. Thee EEOC may review, but not disclose, much of this evidence. In EEOC v.
Associated Dry Goods Corp., the Supreme Court found that the EEOC may not reveal
information about the content of one charging party’s investigative file to another
charging party, even when both employees have brought charges of discrimination
against the same employer. 449 U.S. 590, 603–04 (1981). Instead, the EEOC is
limited to disclosure of “[s]tatistics and other information about an employer’s
general practices.” Id. at 604.
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determine whether the employer has engaged in a pattern or practice
of discrimination.363
The EEOC’s extensive investigative tools in conjunction with its
access to employer-specific data and labor-market specific data,
means that the EEOC occupies an advantageous position to allow it
accurately to assess backpay and other monetary relief that will make
whole the victims of systemic discrimination.364 It also puts the EEOC
in a better position to place the statistical data in context to prove a
pattern or practice of discrimination.365 One problem that Professor
Selmi identified with how the Wal-Mart plaintiffs presented their case
was the failure to “explain the meaning of the regression [analysis] in
a descriptive fashion—what it is that the regression demonstrates
rather than simply emphasizing the variables that have been
controlled for and the statistically significant results.”366 Further,
the EEOC’s litigation department can begin to situate its narrative
of the meaning of the statistics in a recognized legal theory before
filing suit.367
However, private litigants must get data from the employer after
they file their complaint but before certification without the benefit

363. For example, in EEOC v. Konica Minolta Business Solutions U.S.A., Inc., an
African American employee had filed a charge of discrimination in which he alleged
that his employer had disciplined him for not meeting his quotas while failing to
discipline white employees in the same position. 639 F.3d 366, 367 (7th Cir. 2011).
During the investigation, the EEOC discovered the employer hired only six African
Americans out of 120 employees, and all six were at the same facility. Id. This led
the EEOC to broaden the scope of its investigation into the employer’s hiring
practices. Id. It issued a subpoena requesting additional information about the
employer’s hiring practices. Id. at 368. The employer resisted the subpoena, and the
EEOC sought to enforce it in federal court. Id. In affirming the district court’s
decision to enforce the subpoena, the Seventh Circuit noted that the information
was relevant to the initial charge of discrimination, and “that should the agency later
conclude that a broader investigation is warranted, the Commission is entitled to file
its own charge, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b), in which it can allege a pattern or practice
of discrimination and calibrate its investigation accordingly.” Id. at 371.
364. Cf. Malveaux, supra note 7, at 635 (explaining that backpay had been
uncontroversial in Rule 23(b)(2) suits because the relief could be calculated on a
class-wide basis “using an employer’s own personnel data and statistics . . . for each
class member based on a formula that approximates over time what salary an
employee would have received but for an employer’s discrimination”). At a
minimum, the EEOC has access to this sort of information.
365. Cf. Selmi, supra note 2 (discussing the need for plaintiffs to not only present
the statistical data but also to place the data in a narrative context).
366. Id. at 509.
367. See Weiss, supra note 2, at 123 (stating that the Wal-Mart “[p]laintiffs
nominally advanced both a disparate impact and a disparate treatment claim but
made no serious effort to situate their conduit theory within these traditional
legal categories”). The number of EEOC trial attorneys nationwide also means
that they can brainstorm with each other and benefit from other attorneys’
experience and insights.
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of full discovery.368 This necessarily means that they will not be able
to obtain all the data and access to witnesses they need to explain to
the court why the statistics matter. They will also be limited both in
terms of time and resources in their ability to hire experts to analyze
their data. The EEOC, however, can gather data through its
investigation and through the regularly collected EEO surveys. It also
has internal resources in RAS and ORIP to analyze the payroll data
and the resources to hire outside experts, if needed. EEOC
investigators can interview the victims of discrimination, witnesses,
and managerial employees and build a narrative context for the data.
Moreover, the EEOC can do all of this and more fully develop its
legal theory before filing suit. These are important functions given
the skepticism expressed by the Court about the use of statistical
modeling in awarding damages and as proof of the pattern or
practice.369 The EEOC, then, benefits from its role as an institution
vested with the expertise to eradicate patterns or practices of
discrimination in the workplace.
E. The EEOC Litigates in the Public Interest
The EEOC’s lawsuit is not “merely derivative” of the individual
victims of discrimination, and the “EEOC does not stand in the
employee’s shoes.”370 “The EEOC exists to advance the public
interest
in
preventing
and
remedying
employment
371
discrimination . . . .”
Congress authorized the EEOC to file suit to
“implement the public interest as well as to bring about more
effective enforcement of private rights.”372 Although the EEOC can
seek individual relief, “the agency is guided by ‘the overriding public
interest in equal employment opportunity . . . asserted through direct
Federal enforcement.”373 As the Court in Waffle House noted, the
EEOC “is in command of the process” once a charge of
discrimination is filed with the Agency.374 Part of the reason for this
is that Title VII grants the EEOC the authority to represent the public
368. See Malveaux, supra note 7, at 627 (providing that a private litigant must put
facts in a complaint but cannot get facts until after submitting a complaint and
discovery begins).
369. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2555–56, 2561 (2011); see
also supra notes 135–138 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s doubt that
disparate impact claims and discretionary policies could lead to a successful classwide discrimination case).
370. EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc. 534 U.S. 279, 297 (2002).
371. Gen. Tel. Co. of the Nw., Inc. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 331 (1980).
372. Id. at 325–26.
373. Id. at 326 (quoting 118 CONG. REC. 4941 (1972)).
374. Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 291.
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interest in eradicating discrimination and assigns to the EEOC the
responsibility of determining when public resources should be
devoted to seeking relief in federal court.375
Similarly, the EEOC can seek broad relief under Title VII because,
by design, Congress authorized the EEOC to vindicate the rights of
individual victims of discrimination as well as litigate in the public
interest.376 The legislative history behind the 1972 amendments
suggests that Congress viewed the EEOC as the primary enforcer of
Title VII. In its conference report on the bill, the Senate wrote:
It is hoped that recourse to the private lawsuit will be the exception
and not the rule, and that the vast majority of complaints will be
handled through the offices of the EEOC. . . . However, as the
individual’s rights to redress are paramount under the provisions
of Title VII it is necessary that all avenues be left open for quick
and effective relief.377

This also highlights the importance of Title VII’s remedial scheme,
in particular, the grant to the EEOC of “broad enforcement
powers.”378 In General Telephone Co. of the Northwest, the Court
recognized that the expansion of the EEOC’s enforcement authority,
permitting it to file suit in federal court, was driven by Congressional
concern that the “failure to grant the EEOC meaningful enforcement
powers ha[d] proven to be a major flaw in the operation of Title
VII.”379 One of the flaws was that the EEOC could not go to court “to
back up its findings of discrimination” leaving a pattern or practice
suit brought by the Department of Justice as the sole enforcement
mechanism absent individual victims of discrimination going to court
to obtain relief and taking on the associated burdens of litigation.380
Further, in 1991, Congress amended Title VII to allow the EEOC
(and private plaintiffs) to recover compensatory and punitive
damages.381 The Court subsequently affirmed that the EEOC’s role
in acting in the public interest requires it to have access to the full

375. See id. at 291–92 (finding that Title VII “makes the EEOC master of its own
case” and, “absent textual support for a contrary view, it is the public agency’s
province—not that of the court—to determine whether public resources should be
committed to the recovery of victim-specific relief”).
376. Id. at 296.
377. S. REP. NO. 92-415, at 7168, 7565 (1971)).
378. Gen. Tel. Co. of the Nw., 446 U.S. at 333.
379. Id. at 325 (quoting S. REP. NO. 92-415, at 4).
380. Id. at 325 n.7 (quoting S. REP. NO. 92-415, at 4).
381. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 102, 105 Stat. 1071, 1072
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (a)(2012)).
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array of remedies under Title VII.382 In Waffle House, the EEOC
sought injunctive relief and “specific relief designed to make [the
aggrieved individual] whole, including backpay, reinstatement, and
compensatory damages; and [to award] punitive damages for
malicious and reckless conduct.”383 The employer sought to dismiss
the complaint or stay the EEOC’s case for arbitration, arguing that
the employee had agreed to binding arbitration.384 The lower court
found that the EEOC could proceed with its suit because it was not a
party to the arbitration agreement, however, it held that the EEOC
could not seek “victim-specific relief.”385 Its reasoning was that the
EEOC acts in the public interest when it seeks “large-scale injunctive
relief,” but when it seeks individual relief, it “seeks primarily to
vindicate private, rather than public, interests.”386 The Supreme
Court reversed the Fourth Circuit.387 It found that “Congress
expanded the remedies available in EEOC enforcement actions in
1991.”388 The Court noted that punitive damages “serve an obvious
public function in deterring future violations.”389 And, by seeking
make-whole relief for individual victims of discrimination, the EEOC
“may be seeking to vindicate a public interest.”390 It also reasoned
that limiting the EEOC to injunctive relief, would discourage
employees from filing a charge of discrimination thereby
“jeopardiz[ing] the EEOC’s ability to investigate and select cases from
a broad sample of claims.”391
While monetary sanctions against discriminatory employers serve
an important role in deterring future discrimination,392 the EEOC’s
ability to effectively obtain injunctive and declaratory relief may
provide the best method to prevent future discrimination. In many
cases where the EEOC has obtained a favorable decision,393 it has
382. EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 287–88 (2002) (finding that
Congress expanded the EEOC’s enforcement actions to include compensatory and
punitive damages).
383. Id. at 283–84. Although the underlying action was one seeking relief under
the ADA, the same remedies are available as under Title VII, and the EEOC uses the
enforcement mechanisms set forth in Title VII. Id. at 285–86 (citing 42 U.S.C.
§ 12117(a) (1994)).
384. Id. at 284.
385. Id.
386. Id. at 284–85 (quoting Waffle House v. EEOC, 193 F.3d 805, 812 (4th Cir.
1999)).
387. Id. at 285.
388. Id. at 288.
389. Id. at 295.
390. Id. at 296.
391. Id. at 296 n.11.
392. Selmi, supra note 6, at 1316.
393. Professor Modesitt has noted that the EEOC has higher success rates in
litigation than private attorneys: the EEOC’s loss rate in pre-trial dispositive motions
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sought not only monetary relief but also broad injunctive relief.
When the EEOC settles, it directs its trial attorneys to “ensure that
every case is treated as unique and that the settlement contains
carefully drafted provisions designed to provide full redress for the
discriminatory practices at issue and to minimize the likelihood of
their recurrence.”394 At the same time, Professor Selmi cautions
against overreliance on nonmonetary sanctions, in part, because of
the lack of enforcement of injunctive and equitable relief.395
The EEOC’s continued monitoring answers some of the concerns
raised about the effectiveness of injunctive and equitable relief, and
is 5.9%, but private attorneys’ loss rate is 13.2%. Modesitt, supra note 9, at 1248. The
EEOC’s win rate at trial is 50.8%, but private attorneys’ win rate is 38.3%. Id.
Nonetheless, Professor Modesitt does not believe the EEOC is successful because
these rates do not take into account the amount of recovery, which, in her view, is a
better measure of success. Id. To support her conclusion, she cites to Professor
Selmi’s empirical study of the EEOC undertaken nearly two decades ago. Id. (citing
Selmi, supra note 9). Professor Modesitt also states that the EEOC’s litigation
recovery rate as compared to the EEOC mediation program’s recovery rate is
illustrative of the failure of the EEOC’s litigation efforts. Id.
There are two analytical problems with this comparison. The first is that it looks at
the ratio of the dollars spent to the total amount of money recovered as the measure
of the recovery rate. Id. at 1249. A better measure would be the number of
individuals (or even charges per cases handled) and the amount recovered per
individual (or charge per case). For example, in FY 2012, the EEOC litigated 122
merits suits (for all statutes, not just Title VII) and recovered a total of $44.2 million,
or an average of $362,295 per case. EEOC Litigation Statistics FY 1997 Through FY
2012, U.S. E QUAL E MP . O PPORTUNITY C OMMISSION , http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc
/statistics/enforcement/litigation.cfm (last visited Oct. 12, 2013) [hereinafter
EEOC Litigation Statistics]. In contrast, during the same time frame, the EEOC
mediated 11,376 charges and recovered $153.25 million, or an average of $13,471
per mediation. EEOC Mediation Statistics FY 1999 through FY 2012, U.S. EQUAL EMP.
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/mediation/mediation_stats.cfm (last
visited Oct. 12, 2013). The takeaway should be that litigation is expensive and
requires a much greater outlay of resources, not that the EEOC litigation
department is ineffective and not serving victims of discrimination. The second
problem with Professor Modesitt’s argument is that the amount of recovery should
not be determinative of the effectiveness of the EEOC’s litigation efforts, whose value
may not be reflected in the amount of damages awarded to victims of discrimination.
394. EEOC REGIONAL ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 312, pt. 3, § IV.A.2.b(7). An
example of the creativity and range of injunctive relief that the EEOC can obtain to
prevent future violations of Title VII appears in EEOC v. KarenKim, Inc., 698 F.3d 92,
94 (2d Cir. 2012) (per curiam). A jury found that the employer, a grocery store
operator, had subjected a class of female employees to a hostile work environment
and awarded compensatory damages and significant punitive damages. KarenKim,
698 F.3d at 97. The EEOC sought and obtained injunctive relief requiring KarenKim
Inc. to (1) refrain from creating a hostile work environment, (2) not employ or
compensate the harasser, (3) bar the harasser from entering the grocery store
building, and (4) produce and distribute copies of a notice with a photograph
of the harasser indicating that the harasser was barred from entering the
building. Id. at 98.
395. See Selmi, supra note 6, at 1317, 1321–24. At the same time, Professor Selmi
argues that putting a price on discrimination does not adequately deter
discrimination and does not require defendants “to bear the full costs of their
discrimination.” Id. at 1321.
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can prevent future violations of Title VII.396 Once the court signs off
on a consent decree, the EEOC continues to monitor the employer’s
compliance with the terms of the consent decree.397 The EEOC’s
continued oversight also provides protection to claimants who
subsequently experience discrimination but otherwise might not have
stepped forward out of fear of being subjected to retaliation.398
That the EEOC litigates in its own name also speaks to the Rule
23(b)(2) requirement that monetary relief sought by the class
seeking certification be only “incidental” to the injunctive or
declaratory relief.399 The Court in Wal-Mart cited to the Fifth
Circuit’s clarification that “incidental damage should not require
additional hearings to resolve the disparate merits of each
individual’s case; it should neither introduce new substantial legal or
factual issues, nor entail complex individualized determinations.”400
Because the EEOC is able to bring suit in its own name and does not
stand in the shoes of individual litigants, its pattern or practice suit
does not rely on the merits of individual claims.401 Courts trying the
EEOC’s case can also bifurcate the proceedings to determine
whether the employer is liable for the pattern or practice in the first
instance, and then once liability for the pattern or practice of
discrimination is established, hold proceedings on the appropriate
remedy in which individual claims for damage are presented.402

396. Cf. id. at 1330–31 (suggesting that EEOC oversight of consent decree
implementation in class action settlements “might help restore public
accountability”).
397. EEOC REGIONAL ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 312, pt. 3, § IV.E.
398. See supra notes 343–348 and accompanying text (discussing how EEOC
litigation can provide protection to class members who fear retaliation).
399. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2560 (2011).
400. Id. (quoting Allison v. Citgo Petrol. Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 415 (5th Cir. 1998)).
401. Cf. Green, supra note 2, at 452 (acknowledging that “the systemic nature of
disparate treatment law does raise questions about the relationship between private
litigation and public enforcement” and that systemic theories defy “rigid adherence
to individualized inquiries . . . of culpability . . . [and] relief”).
402. See, e.g., Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 361–62 (1977)
(stating once a pattern or practice is demonstrated, the court should conduct
additional proceedings to determine individual remedies); EEOC v. Burlington Med.
Supplies, Inc., 536 F. Supp. 2d 647, 656 (E.D. Va. 2008) (recognizing that courts
generally bifurcate the trial into two phases); EEOC v. Dial Corp., 156 F. Supp. 2d
926, 957–58 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (describing the bifurcated trial as including Phase I, in
which “the jury will be instructed to find whether Dial engaged in a pattern or
practice of maintaining an environment sexually hostile to women,” and Phase II, in
which “the jury will be asked to determine (1) whether particular plaintiffs
subjectively perceived the environment to be hostile or abusive, and (2) if so,
whether such plaintiffs can establish a basis for individual liability”); see also Bent,
Systemic Harassment, supra note 9, at 171–75 (discussing the different approaches
courts have taken to bifurcation in hostile work environment cases).
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Moreover, because the EEOC is a public institution, it can bring
pattern or practice cases that the private bar might be unwilling or
unable to bring. Such cases could include claims “where the
monetary relief might be limited, the focus is on injunctive relief, or
the victims are in underserved communities.”403 The EEOC also can
focus its efforts on emerging or cutting edge issues that the private
bar might be hesitant to take on.404 In its most recent Strategic
Enforcement Plan, the EEOC asserted that it “will target emerging
issues in equal employment law, including issues associated with
significant events, demographic changes, developing theories, new
legislation, judicial decisions and administrative interpretations.”405
Since the EEOC litigates in the public interest, it does so in the
public eye. As discussed above, the EEOC will not agree to
confidentiality provisions when settling406 and will usually issue
press releases when it files a lawsuit, achieves a favorable
dispositive ruling, settles a case, or wins at trial or on appeal. 407
The EEOC’s role in litigating in the public interest and its
attendant obligations to do so in public view can result in better
public oversight of necessary organizational changes that can
eliminate systemic causes of discrimination within workplaces.408
The EEOC’s ability to garner media attention also means that
employers and employees are educated about the law, “preventing
future violations, and encouraging victims of discrimination in
other settings to step forward.”409

403. EEOC SYSTEMIC INITIATIVE, supra note 352, at 2; see also Waterstone, supra note
9, at 462 (asserting that “few private lawyers can match the government’s resources
when it decides to use them in a particular direction”).
404. Cf. Waterstone, supra note 9, at 459 (noting the impact the DOJ’s early
litigation efforts made on the development of disparate impact theory).
405. EEOC STRATEGIC ENFORCEMENT PLAN FOR FY 2013–2016, supra note 343, at 1.
406. See supra notes 312–313 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of
political accountability through oversight).
407. See, e.g., EEOC Sues Prestige Transportation Service for Pattern and Practice of Hiring
Discrimination, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION (Feb. 26, 2013),
www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/2-26-13.cfm (announcing that the EEOC
sued a Miami transportation company for subjecting African Americans to race
discrimination); Jury Rules for EEOC in Sexual Harassment Case Against the Finish Line, U.S.
EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION (Feb. 1, 2013), www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom
/release/2-1-13a.cfm (announcing that a jury found that a thirty-eight-year-old
general manager subjected three female subordinates to severe sexual harassment);
Owners of Albuquerque-Area IHOPs to Settle EEOC Sexual Harassment Suit for $1 Million,
U.S. EQUAL EMP. O PPORTUNITY C OMMISSION (Nov. 13, 2012), www.eeoc.gov/eeoc
/newsroom/release/11-13-12b.cfm (announcing a settlement with two IHOP
restaurants in a class sex discrimination lawsuit for $1 million).
408. See Green, supra note 6, at 717–18 (discussing the lack of public safeguards
and investment in long-term institutional reform by private firms).
409. EEOC REGIONAL ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 312, pt. 3, § IV.D.4.
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Of course, the EEOC’s ability to bring suit is limited by its
resources.410 And, the number of suits brought by individual, private
plaintiffs under Title VII substantially eclipsed the sixty-six Title VII
suits brought by the EEOC in fiscal year 2012.411 Additionally, some
scholars have been concerned about either administrative capture in
public enforcement generally or the “behavioral incentives of [the
EEOC’s] attorneys” as undermining the EEOC’s public interest
model.412 Still, as Professor Waterstone noted in the context of
enforcement of the American with Disabilities Act, “for several
reasons, none [of the concerns] should be conversation stoppers.”413
In making the case generally for public enforcement of civil rights
laws, Professor Waterstone observed that the “expressive function of
the law cannot be completely outsourced to private actors and is lost
when civil rights lawsuits become profit-driven enterprises.”414 This is
particularly true in light of the challenges to private Title VII class
actions, as discussed above. The EEOC’s public interest mission
means that it serves to educate the public, deters future
discrimination, and crafts remedies in a manner that private litigants
cannot. It is this aspect of the EEOC’s litigation authority that
provides the strongest response to concerns about the private pattern
or practice and provides the best support for preserving the EEOC’s
litigation authority.
CONCLUSION
Although the private pattern or practice is under attack and may
not survive post-Wal-Mart, the EEOC has an essential role in the
enforcement of Title VII, which can address many of the concerns
expressed about private pattern or practice litigation. The pattern or
practice claim has several advantages and provides benefits to
410. For an overview of some of the challenges facing the EEOC, see Modesitt,
supra note 9.
411. EEOC Litigation Statistics, supra note 393. During the same time period, the
EEOC resolved an additional 162 suits involving Title VII claims. Id. While the
statistics for private Title VII actions filed in federal courts are unavailable, between
March 31, 2011, and March 31, 2012, 12,709 “federal question” employment cases
were filed in United States District Courts. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS,
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS 48 tbl. C-2 (2012), available at http://www
.uscourts.gov/Viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/Statistics/FederalJudicialCaseloadStatistic
s/2012/tables/C02Mar12.pdf; see also EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 291
n.7 (2002) (noting that “the EEOC files fewer than two percent of all
antidiscrimination claims in federal court,” and “the EEOC files suit in less than one
percent of the charges filed each year”).
412. Waterstone, supra note 9, at 451.
413. Id. at 452–53.
414. Id. at 454 (footnote omitted); see also Green, supra note 6, at 716–17 (discussing
concerns over “private co-option of larger public antidiscrimination goals”).
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employees, employers, the courts, and the public. Most importantly,
pattern or practice claims can address the problem of systemic
discrimination, whether caused by conscious or unconscious biases,
in a way that individual disparate treatment cases cannot. Because
the concerns expressed about the private pattern or practice claim, in
large part, disappear or are addressed when the EEOC brings a
systemic claim in its own name, courts that treat the EEOC as just
another litigant vindicating a private right misapprehend the EEOC’s
vital role.
In turn, the EEOC should carefully guard its role as an
independent agency that litigates in the public interest. To that end,
the EEOC should embrace its position as a leading litigator of Title
VII claims and follow through on its commitment, as expressed in its
most recent Strategic Enforcement Plan, to bring more systemic
claims.415 Congress, too, should tread carefully to avoid the problems
of over-politicization that it has imposed on other independent
agencies.416 Moreover, given the EEOC’s vital role in enforcing Title
VII, it is imperative that Congress provide the EEOC with adequate
resources to investigate and litigate systemic cases.417 Because the
EEOC is different from a private litigant, for the same reasons
discussed above that support courts’ respect for the EEOC’s status as
a public actor. Congress should likewise keep in mind the Agency’s
purpose. As we approach the fiftieth anniversary of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, the EEOC remains a powerful fist in the fight against
systemic discrimination.

415. See supra notes 354–355 and accompanying text (discussing the EEOC’s
enforcement priorities as outlined in its Strategic Enforcement Plan). See generally
EEOC STRATEGIC ENFORCEMENT PLAN FOR FY 2013–2016, supra note 343.
416. See, e.g., Devins & Lewis, supra note 316, at 489 (noting that in the last two
decades, appointments to several independent regulatory commissions—including
the Federal Communications Commission, Federal Election Commission, Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, and National Labors Relations Board—have suffered from
“batching,” a situation in which “the opposition party demands that the President
nominate a party loyalist to an opposition-party slot in exchange for the opposition
party supporting the President’s same-party nominations”).
417. See supra notes 310–311 (noting that Congress expresses approval or
disapproval of the EEOC’s enforcement goals through its control of the
EEOC’s budget).

